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LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: PROGRESS TOWARDS
COMMUNITY-WIDE RIGHTS OF
PRACTICE
RogerJ. Goebel*
The winds of change are blowing in the legal profession in
the European Community ("E.C."), and they are blowing in
the direction of enhanced cross-border practice rights. There
is unmistakable progress toward an integrated market for the
practice of law throughout the Community.
The tangible evidence of change comes in a variety of
forms. The underlying roots are economic. As the European
Community moves with increasing dynamism toward achieve-
ment of its goal of an integrated internal market, the need for
sophisticated legal assistance to commercial and financial en-
terprises operating on a Community-wide scale becomes ever
more apparent. Client needs and desires drive the legal mar-
ket, as they do other markets.
In the last half-dozen years there has been a manifest
trend toward national law firms expanding into a cross-border
practice within the Community and elsewhere in Europe. Na-
tional law firms have increased their in-house competence both
in Community law itself and in corporate and commercial prac-
tice in other states, encouraging some of their lawyers to spe-
cialize in these fields and acquiring added expertise by recruit-
ing competent personnel both at the partner and employee
level. Large firms have aggressively expanded their European
market service capabilities by opening new branches and ex-
panding existing ones in other states, and/or by mergers, joint
ventures or close association with law firms in other states.
The expansion of cross-border practice by law firms paral-
lels that of international accounting firms. Major multinational
clients find it increasingly convenient to deal with the same
legal or accounting firm on a European-wide basis. The client
seeks in this way to satisfy its desire for easier communication
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with key advisors, for the application of uniform standards of
service, and for reliable assurances of quality control. Trans-
national legal and accounting firms can also claim to offer
more rapid and larger scale efforts to resolve complicated cor-
porate, financial or tax issues that transcend national bounda-
ries.
Although the focus of this Article is on developments in
the European Community, this phenomenon has, of course, a
global character.' U.S. law firms were among the first interna-
tional practice specialists, opening branches in Europe and
throughout the world. Correlatively, New York and a growing
number of other U.S. states have permitted access to their
legal markets to foreign law firms engaged in practice as legal
consultants.2 As central and eastern European states move to-
ward capitalism, they have been impelled to seek sophisticated
1. The developments in recent years have been so rapid that most of the prior
legal literature is outdated in part. Excellent surveys of European Community
("E.C.") law and the national rules of its Member States are SERGE-PIERRE LAGUETrE,
LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1987) and LINDA S. SPEDDING, TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE EEC AND THE UNITED STATES (1987). The CCBE
CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM (Dorothy Donald-Little ed., 1991) is intended
ultimately to describe the rules of practice in all Community states, but thus far has
up-to-date coverage only of Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. An earlier gen-
eral reference work on the status of the legal profession in 30 countries is TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES (D. Campbell ed., 1982).
The American Bar Association's Section of International Law and Practice has pub-
lished a valuable short book on the status of foreign lawyers in selected states in the
United States and foreign countries, edited by its co-chairman, Sydney Cone. See
SYDNEY M. CONE, THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN LAWYERS (3d ed. 1984); see also LEGAL
TRADITIONS AND SYSTEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK (Alan N. Katz ed., 1986)
(discussing legal system, courts, and legal profession in selected countries).
For a law review survey, see Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and Educa-
tional Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TUL.
L. REV. 443 (1989). The International Financial Law Review is the best source of ongo-
ing news on international business law practice in centers around the world, regularly
providing short reviews on selected countries. Lawyers in Europe is a journal contain-
ing useful articles on developments in the legal profession throughout Europe.
Though out of date, still worth reading is a thoughtful student note. See Kelly
Charles Crabb, Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries: Making Room for the
American Attorney, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1767 (1983); see also Benjamin Busch, The Right of
United States Lawyers to Practice Abroad (pts. 1-3), 3 INT'L LAW. 297, 617, 903 (1968-
1969); Takeo Kosugi, Regulation of Practice by Foreign Lawyers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 678
(1979).
2. As of December 1991, the District of Columbia and 10 states had laws grant-
ing the status of legal consultant to qualified foreign lawyers: Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas.
See Houst n Putnam Lowry, Foreign Legal Consultants in Connecticut, 16 INT'L LEGAL
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legal assistance and hence to open their borders to transna-
tional legal practice. To a significant degree, local barriers to
international legal practice have also been reduced in the Far
East and other parts of the world.4
Apart from economic forces driving legal practice, there
have also been major (and on-going) changes in the regulatory
environment. Although mention will be made of recent legis-
lation governing lawyers in Belgium, France, Germany, and
the United Kingdom, the focus of this Article will be on the
evolution of the European Community rules affecting lawyers'
right of practice. The Council of the Bars and Laws Societies
of the European Community ("CCBE") has been an important
factor in promoting Community legal practice, and its role will
also be reviewed in this Article. Finally, this Article will con-
sider developments in U.S.-E.C. cross-border practice.
In its structural review of the development of European
Community rules relating to the right of practice by lawyers,
this Article will cover the following topics: I The Context of
Community Law on Lawyers' Rights; II The Rights of Profes-
sionals; III Rules on Lawyers' Freedom to Provide Services; IV
Lawyers' Right of Professional Establishment; V Mutual Rec-
ognition of Higher-Education Diplomas; VI The Role of the
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Com-
munity; VII The State of Progress Toward Community-wide
Rights of Practice; and VIII Reflections on U.S.-E.C. Cross-
Border Practice.
PRAC. 115 (1991). See generally Sydney Cone III, Are Some Lawyers More Equal Than
Others?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1989, at 17; Goebel, supra note 1, at 469-73.
3. See generally Patrick Stewart, East European Lawyers Learning Western Ways, INT'L
FIN. L. REv.,July 1990, at 13. See also Patrick Stewart, Budapest is Back in Business, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., June 1991, at 21; Patrick Stewart, Czechoslovakia's Lawyers Post-Privatisa-
tion, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1991, at 21; Patrick Stewart, Free Market Perils in Poland,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1991, at 14.
4. On the rules governing foreign lawyers in Hong Kong and Singapore and on
the Japanese Foreign Lawyers Law of May 23, 1986, see Goebel, supra note 1, at 481-
85. On the Japanese law, see Andrew Behevine, Note, Professionalization of the Japanese
Attorney and the Role of Foreign Lawyers in Japan, 19 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. 1061
(1987). For current news, see James S. Altschul, Foreign Lawyers Head for Indonesia,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1991, at 21; Chris Darbyshire, Time to Reform and Rethink for
Singapore's Lawyers, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1991, at 17; Patrick Stewart, Is Hong Kong
Ready for 1997?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1991, at 9; Samantha Swiss, Taiwan's About
Face on Foreign Lawyers, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1991, at 27.
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I. THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY LAW
ON L4 WYERS' RIGHTS
At the outset, it is desirable to make four preliminary com-
ments in order to place the review of substantive Community
rules in a broader context.
A. The Effect of the Internal Market Goal
First is the relation between the current expansion of law-
yers' rights of practice and the internal market goal. As is now
well known, the European Community is close to achieving an
integrated internal market by December 31, 1992. This goal
was initially stated in a major Commission study, the June 1985
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market ("White Pa-
per").5 The White Paper proclaimed the need to eliminate
legal and economic barriers among the Member States in or-
der to create a single integrated market, and urged the adop-
tion of 279 measures intended to remove these barriers.
In the fall of 1985, the Community adopted a major series
of amendments to the 1957 European Economic Community
Treaty ("EEC Treaty" or "Treaty"), called the Single Euro-
pean Act ("SEA"), which went into effect on July 1, 1987.6
One of the crucial amendments constituted the adoption of
5. Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 (June
1985) [hereinafter White Paper].
6. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC
Treaty], amended by the Single European Act of July 1, 1987, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter Single European Act], is contained in TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (ECSC, EEC, EAEC) (Office for Official
Publ. of the EC, 1987). All subsequent citations to EEC Treaty articles in the text are
to this volume. There is an enormous amount of literature on the internal market
goal and the Single European Act. Particularly useful are AUDREY WINTER ET AL.,
EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE (1989); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann,
The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361
(1987) (author was then Director-General of Commission Legal Service); Hans-Joa-
chim Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
446 (1987) (author was then Director-General of Council Legal Service). The Treaty
on European Union of February 7, 1992, currently in the process of ratification, does
not modify any of the Treaty articles analyzed in this Article, other than to provide in
new Article 189b for an increased role for Parliament in the adoption of legislation
pursuant to the articles analyzed. The Treaty on European Union will change the
name of the European Economic Community to the European Community, which is
the term used throughout this Article.
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this goal. A new Treaty Article 8a mandates "establishing the
internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992,"
and defines this internal market as "an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, serv-
ices and capital is ensured."
The internal market goal has directly affected lawyers'
rights, because eliminating barriers to the exercise of profes-
sions in general constituted a major element in the White Pa-
per program. The program's most significant achievement
thus far has been the 1988 Council directive on recognition of
higher-education diplomas, discussed later in Part V, which is
intended to facilitate the ability of persons engaged in profes-
sional activity to acquire rights of practice in a Member State
other than that in which they have been educated.7
The indirect effect of the internal market goal has been
perhaps even more significant. Commercial and financial in-
terests, the media, and the public at large have enthusiastically
embraced the internal market goal. This enthusiasm has cre-
ated a psychological attitude favoring the market integration of
fields, such as the practice of law, that have not yet been fully
integrated by Community legislation.
As the Community wave of legislation to achieve the inter-
nal market has advanced in such complex and important fields
as banking, insurance, securities, telecommunications, intellec-
tual property, public procurement, environmental protection,
consumer protection and social rights, the need for Commu-
nity law expertise has become manifest in all major commercial
centers. This both facilitates the ability of firms to carry on
cross-border practice in those centers and reduces the ten-
dency to see law practice exclusively in terms of competence in
a particular local law system. In a sense, what is gradually de-
veloping is a certain "federalization" of law in the Community
and the emergence of an informal bar specialized in Commu-
nity law.
Moreover, there is no question that the internal market
goal has influenced the national legislators in those states that
7. Council Directive No. 89/48 of Dec. 21, 1988 on a general system for the
recognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional ed-
ucation and training of at least three years' duration, OJ. L 19/16 (1989) [hereinafter
Diploma Directive].
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have recently revised their regulation of the legal profession.
Likewise, it has influenced lawyers and law firms in states that
have traditionally been reticent toward cross-border law prac-
tice to change their attitude to one of acceptance of Commu-
nity rights of practice in one form or another.
B. The Trend Toward Liberalization of National Rules
The second preliminary comment thus relates to the first:
it is that dramatic changes have occurred in the last few years
in the rules of practice in Belgium, France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and other states, which in most cases will fa-
cilitate cross-border practice. Regrettably, space considera-
tions preclude any substantial coverage of these developments,
but a quick description is possible and occasional reference
will be made to the new national rules when relevant in later
parts of this Article.
Thus, since 1984 the Brussels Bar Councils (both Flemish
and French) have allowed qualified foreign lawyers relatively
easy access to a B-list of avocats (courtroom lawyers), so that
they can become both employees of, and partners in, Belgian
avocat firms.8 The Bar Councils' rules were further liberalized
in the late 1980s to allow Belgian avocats and avocat firms to
form cost-sharing alliances, joint venture associations, and
even partnerships with foreign law firms whose partners are B-
list avocats. Belgian avocat firms may also form associations
with foreign law firms for specific areas of practice, notably
Community law. These rules have enhanced Brussels' role as a
center for the practice of Community law. Over 100 foreign
lawyers are registered on the B-list, over 50 foreign firms have
offices in Brussels, and several leading Belgian firms have en-
tered into associations with foreign firms.
In 1990, the United Kingdom adopted the Courts and
8. Rhglement d'Ordre Int~rieur de I'Ordre des Avocats du Barreau de Brux-
elles, arts. 69-79 (Bel. 1984). The Brussels Bar Councils' rules and their effect in
practice are described in Carl Bevernage, Regulation of the Profession: The Institutional
Framework and Accommodations of Foreign Lawyers: The Belgium System, in INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PRACTICE TODAY: PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ETHICS AND LIABILITY (Mary C.
Daly & Roger J. Goebel eds., forthcoming 1992) (on file with Fordham International
LawJournal). For background, see Goebel, supra note 1, at 475-78. For current news,
see Christina Morton, Brussels: Goldmine or Bandwagon?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1989,
at 23.
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Legal Services Act that radically revised the rules governing its
legal professions. 9 Among other developments, the act per-
mits solicitors to form inter-disciplinary partnerships with
other professionals, allows Community lawyers easier admis-
sion to solicitor status, and enables solicitors to form partner-
ships with foreign lawyers, including non-Community lawyers,
such as U.S. lawyers. The act does not change the traditional
U.K. rule that barristers and solicitors have exclusive rights to
plead before courts and to prepare documents transferring ti-
tle to real estate or administering estates, but do not otherwise
have a monopoly on legal advice or activities. In view of the
U.K.'s traditionally liberal attitude toward foreign law firm
practice, it is not surprising that there are estimated to be over
120 law firms with offices in London.
On December 13, 1989, Germany revised its Federal At-
torneys Act governing the practice of law by Rechtsanwdlte
(courtroom lawyers).' The law formally permits Rechtsanwdlte
for the first time to have offices abroad (section 29a) and quali-
fied foreign lawyers to practice under their home title in Ger-
many (section 206). Community lawyers may practice their
own country's law, Community law, and international law.
Non-Community lawyers, including U.S. lawyers, may practice
their own country's law (and probably international and Com-
munity law by implication), provided that their home country
9. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 (Eng.) The U.K. legislation and rules are
described in Hamish Adamson, Regulation of the Profession: The Institutional Framework
and Accommodations of Foreign Lawyers, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE TODAY: PRO-
FESSIONAL REGULATION, ETHICS AND LIABILITY, supra note 8. For a detailed analysis of
the U.K. government's White and Green Papers proposing the new legislation, see
Michael Zander, The Thatcher Government's Onslaught on the Lawyers: Who Won?, 24 INT'L
LAw. 753 (1990). See also Robert Clow, Outpost of Empire: Expensive Luxury or Good
Business?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1990, supp. at x (providing survey of foreign law
firms in London); Patrick Stewart, Multinational Partnerships or Alien Ill, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., May 1991, at 19 (reviewing Law Society's proposed rules).
10. Gesetz Zur Anderung des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwalte vom 13. Dez.
1989, Bundesgestzblatt No. 58, S. 2135 (1989). The German legislation is described
in Andreas Junius, Regulation of the Profession: The Institutional Framework and Accommo-
dations of Foreign Lawyers: The German System, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE To-
DAY: PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ETHICS AND LIABILITY, supra note 8. The 1987 Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court judgment that incited the new German rules is
discussed in Wolfgang Kiihn, New Professional Rules for Attorneys in the Federal Republic of
Germany: The European Court and the Federal Constitutional Court Shake the Profession, 14
INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 48 (1989). For news following the 1989 law, see Chris Darbyshire,
Frankfurt: The Next Outpost of Anglo-Saxon Empire, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1991, at 17.
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offers reciprocal rights to German Rechtsanwdlte. Since January
1990, many German law firms have merged or opened
branches in other cities, a wave of foreign law firms have
opened offices in Frankfurt, Berlin and other centers, and sev-
eral German firms have formed joint venture associations with
foreign firms.
The Paris Bar Council in 1985 adopted rules enabling
Community lawyers to become French avocats (courtroom law-
yers) after eight years of professional experience and the pas-
sage of a moderately difficult special examination. Approxi-
mately 100 Community lawyers have thus become fully quali-
fied French avocats. These French rules are currently being
revised to bring them into accord with the 1988 Council direc-
tive on the recognition of higher-education diplomas, dis-
cussed later in Part V.
More important is the French law of December 31, 1990
that has just merged, as of January 1, 1991, the professions of
avocat and conseiljuridique (legal advisor)." The French law af-
fects foreign lawyers, because those already registered as con-
seils juridiques will become avocats, while in the future any for-
eign lawyers must gain admission to the profession of avocat
through the mode laid down for Community lawyers noted
above, or through arrangements based on reciprocity for non-
Community lawyers. Moreover, in article 54 of the December
31, 1990 law, France granted the new merged profession a mo-
nopoly on providing legal advice and activities. Many foreign
law firms whose lawyers were previously conseils juridiques thus
will be effectively converted into avocat firms (with the possibil-
ity of associations or partnerships with French avocat firms).
However, some U.K. solicitor firms that have practiced in Paris
under their home state title, rather than having their lawyers
qualify as conseils juridiques, may have their right to practice
challenged under the new grant of a legal monopoly to avocats
(see Part VII.B).
In addition to the above-described revisions in rules in
11. Modification de la Loi No. 71-1130 du 31 Dcembre 1971 Portant R~forme
de Certaines Professions Judiciaires et Juridiques, 1991 J.O. 220 (Fr.). The French
legislation is described in Christian Raoult, Regulation of the Profession: Institutional
Framework and Accommodations of Foreign Lawyers: The French System, in INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PRACTICE TODAY: PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ETHICS AND LIABILITY, supra
note 8.
1991-19921
564 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:556
Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, other
states have either modified their rules, or the interpretation of
prior rules, usually, but not always, in the direction of facilitat-
ing cross-border practice.1 2 Unfortunately, space constraints
do not permit discussion of these changes, although it should
be noted that Luxembourg's new law of August 10, 1991 con-
tains potentially serious restrictions on cross-border practice. 3
C. The Importance of Law Firm Practice
Although the European Community legislation and case
law has been addressed to the subject of the rights of practice
of individual lawyers, it is no longer possible to ignore the im-
portance of appropriate coverage of the extent of rights of law
firms to carry out practice in other Member States.
International or cross-border practice of law is carried on
principally by law firms rather than by individual practitioners.
This is not surprising, because individual practitioners are lim-
ited in their capacity to develop expertise in many legal sys-
tems and in their capability to provide sophisticated advice
rapidly on complex international or cross-border issues. Mul-
tinational clients increasingly seek to rely on their customary
law firms to provide assistance on transactions throughout the
international commercial world. If the customary outside
counsel firm is incapable of providing the legal assistance it-
self, the multinational client is apt to seek out another law firm
with greater international or cross-border expertise for this
purpose.
In recent years, a decided trend toward multi-country law
firm practice has become manifest. Many national law firms
now have a network of branch offices in leading commercial
centers outside their home country, or have joint venture or
12. Useful news notes on developments in Community states not discussed in
the text are Giuseppe Bisconti, Reform of the Professional Law in Italy, 14 INT'L LEGAL
PRAC. 55 (1989); Robert Clow, Throwing Down the Gauntlet, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr.
1990, supp. at i (the Netherlands); John Georgakakis, Greece Allows Lawyers to Form
Companies, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1990, at 12; Dominic Pini, Italy: Legal Profession-A
Case of Transformismo, 1 LAW. IN EUR., May/June 1990, at 11; Patrick Stewart, An Irish
Fight for Market Share, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1992, at 17; Patrick Stewart, Is the Siesta
Over for Spanish Lawyers?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1991, at 20.
13. Loi du 10 aofit 1991 sur la profession d'avocat, 1991 J.O. A-No. 58 1110
(Lux.). The restrictive approach of the draft for the Luxembourg rules is criticized in
Josephine Carr, Luxembourg Lawyers Bolt the Door, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1989, at 8.
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affiliated relations with law firms in other countries.1 4 This
trend is particularly manifest in the European Community.
Moreover, the initial quasi-monopoly of international U.S. and
U.K. law firms operating in this fashion has been broken. In-
creasingly, Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish,
and other firms are opening foreign branch offices or develop-
ing joint venture. or affiliated links abroad.
Consequently, in evaluating the course of progress in the
Community toward cross-border and Community-wide prac-
tice rights, it is necessary to consider those rules that are desir-
able not only for individual lawyers, but also for law firms.
D. State Interests as a Limitation on Lawyers' Practice Rights
Even though we may start from the premise that the cross-
border practice of law is desirable from a number of policy
viewpoints, such as the promotion of a client's free choice of
qualified counsel, helping clients to bridge social and cultural
differences in the conduct of international business affairs, the
promotion of freedom of services in international trade, and
the further premise that an integrated market in legal services
should be a constitutive feature of an overall integrated Com-
munity market, nonetheless we must recognize that states have
legitimate concerns as to the character and quality of legal
services that foreign lawyers and law firms may provide on
their territory.
Thus, states have a genuine interest in the appropriate
consumer protection of clients, particularly unsophisticated
clients, when foreign lawyers or law firms attempt to provide
services in fields of law that have strong national public policy
features, such as criminal law, family law, and the administra-
tion of decedents' estates. Moreover, states have a legitimate
concern that lawyers practice law in an ethical fashion and in
consonance with imperative professional responsibility rules.
Although reference to such legitimate state interests can
occasionally be a pretext when a state's real concern is to pro-
14. Examination of the entries in the 1992 Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory
for leading commercial centers in the Community and around the world gives a pic-
ture of the branch office networks of prominent law firms based in Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and other countries.
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tect the economic interests of local lawyers and law firms,
nonetheless these state interests have real merit and deserve
respectful consideration in the development of any system of
cross-border or Community-wide practice.
These four preliminary comments will be particularly rele-
vant later in Part VII when evaluating the state of progress to-
ward Community-wide rights of practice. It is also useful to
keep them in mind as we review and analyze the substantive
rules in Parts II to VI.
II. THE RIGHTS OF PROFESSIONALS
In all Member States of the European Community, per-
sons occupied in legal affairs are regarded as engaged in the
conduct of a profession, usually licensed or authorized by the
state or a self-governing professional body acting with author-
ity delegated by the state. Therefore, in terms of Community
law, lawyers are generally treated as falling within the generic
category of professionals.
To properly understand the origin and basic character of
the right of professionals licensed or authorized in one Mem-
ber State of the E.C. to practice in other states, we must begin
with the fundamental principles of the EEC Treaty. Article 3,
which defines the field of activities of the Community, gives a
pre-eminent place to the so-called four fundamental freedoms,
which are the freedom of movement of goods, persons, serv-
ices and capital.
The right of professionals to practice occasionally in other
states is founded on the right of freedom to provide services,
while the right of professionals to practice while residing in
another state is founded on the right of establishment. As we
shall see later, it is because these rights are so fundamental in
the Treaty framework that the Court ofJustice has been willing
to go far in its Treaty construction to protect them in individ-
ual cases.
Further chapters of the EEC Treaty contain specific arti-
cles concerning the rights of establishment and the free move-
ment of services, but before turning to them, a word on the
free movement of workers. This topic is relevant for two rea-
sons. First, many lawyers, like other professionals, are employ-
ees (as opposed to being self-employed or partners in a firm)
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and are therefore governed in part by the rules on the free
movement of workers. Second, the rules and case law applying
the free movement of workers tended to develop earlier in
Community history and have influenced the later evolution of
rules in the areas of establishment and the free movement of
services.
The attainment of the right of free movement of workers
has been one of the great successes of the European Commu-
nity. Article 48 of the EEC Treaty broadly defines the right
and has been supplemented by a detailed coverage in Council
Regulation No. 1612/68 of October 15, 1968 on freedom of
movement for workers within the Community. 5 This regula-
tion specifies a worker's right to move to any Member State
(often called the host state) in order to take up employment,
change to new employment in the same state, and stay on after
the employment ends (which includes the right to retire in the
host state, under certain conditions). Article 48 also prescribes
the "abolition of any discrimination based on nationality be-
tween workers of the Member States as regards employment,
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment,"
and this principle of non-discrimination is further elaborated
in Regulation No. 1612/68.
Furthermore, Regulation No. 1612/68 grants a worker's
spouse and immediate family derivative rights to live with the
worker in the host Member State, as well as to be treated on a
non-discriminatory basis in obtaining access to education or
social benefits.
The Court of Justice has consistently defined the scope of
the rights of workers and their families in the broadest possible
fashion. The Court held early that Article 48 had "direct ef-
fect," and was thus immediately binding in Member States re-
gardless of the existence of any national legislation, providing
immediate rights to individuals that may be vindicated in na-
tional court or administrative proceedings.' 6
15. Council Regulation No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers
within the Community, J.O. L 257/2 (1968), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, II, at 475.
Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, regulations have immediate force of law
throughout the Community.
16. Commission v. France, Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
216. For general coverage of the Court of Justice case law on free movement of
workers, see NICHoLAs GREEN ET AL., THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SINGLE EURO-
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The White Paper expressed general satisfaction with the
success in achieving the free movement of workers, but, in con-
trast, observed that the field of the free movement of profes-
sionals had remained an area of "little progress. '"7
The EEC Treaty chapters on the right of establishment
and the freedom to provide services are concerned principally
with corporate, commercial, and financial enterprises and ac-
tivities, which are beyond the scope of this Article.' 8 We will
deal with these Treaty articles only insofar as they concern
professionals. Article 52 of the EEC Treaty calls for the pro-
gressive elimination of restrictions on the right of establish-
ment for professionals (i.e., the right to reside in another
Member State, the host state, and exercise the profession
there), whether self-employed or in an association or firm of
professionals. Similarly, Article 59 mandates the progressive
elimination of restrictions on the right to provide professional
services in other Member States. Article 59 is supplemented
by Article 60, which allows a right of temporary residence in
the state in which the service is provided (the host state), and
requires the service provider to receive national treatment as
regards any host state conditions in providing the service.
Both Articles 52 and 59 anticipated the complete removal of
restrictions by the end of the initial EEC Treaty transition pe-
riod, December 31, 1969.
The Treaty did permit restrictions on the right of profes-
sional establishment for reasons of "public policy, public se-
curity or public health" in Article 56, as well as for "activities
... connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official
authority" in Article 55. Article 66 made both of these Arti-
cles' limitations applicable to the provision of services.
Article 54 directed the Council of Ministers to set up a
general program "for the abolition of existing restrictions on
PEAN MARKET (1991); PJ.G. KAPTEYN & PIETER VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AFTER THE COMING INTO FORCE OF
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT (2d ed. 1989); DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC (2d ed. 1987).
17. White Paper, supra note 5, 89, 91. The Commission stated that "[in the
case of employees . . . free movement is almost entirely complete." Id. 89.
18. For a general review, see DOMINIK LASOK, THE PROFESSIONS AND SERVICES IN
THE EEC (1986). See also KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 16; HANS
SMIT & PETER HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY, arts. 52-66 ann. (1984).
LA WYERS' RIGHTS
freedom of establishment" (which thus was intended to
achieve freedom of professional establishment as well as com-
mercial or financial establishment) and then to implement this
program by directives. Similarly, Article 63 directed the Coun-
cil of Ministers to set up a general program to achieve the free-
dom to provide services (including professional services),
again to be implemented by directives. (Directives are a form
of legislation by which Member States receive binding instruc-
tions to take specific legislative or regulatory measures."9 )
Given the scope of these Treaty articles, it may seem sur-
prising that they did not result in the same level of success as
that achieved for the free movement of workers. At least in
part, this has resulted from the impact of another article, Arti-
cle 57. This article states that "in order to make it easier" for
professionals to exercise the right of establishment, the Coun-
cil shall "issue directives for the mutual recognition of diplo-
mas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications."
Although Article 57 was obviously intended to facilitate the
right of establishment, it was initially thought to require a sys-
tem for the recognition of diplomas as a virtual pre-condition
to the right of professional establishment. For many years, the
Commission and the Member States viewed the right of pro-
fessional establishment as essentially non-existent unless and
until a directive recognizing professional diplomas and qualifi-
cations should be adopted.
Little progress occurred from 1957 to 1975. It is true that
the Council of Ministers issued on December 18, 1961 the
General Program for the removal of restrictions in freedom to
provide services 2° and the General Program for the removal of
restrictions on freedom of establishment, 2' required respec-
tively by Articles 54 and 63. These were useful to a limited
extent in indicating the areas in which directives were to be
adopted before December 31, 1969 and in forbidding various
types of discriminatory national rules. In fact, however, the
19. Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, directives do not have immediate legal
effect within Member States, but the states are legally bound to enact legislation,
issue regulations, or otherwise take action that fully effectuates directives. If Member
States do not implement directives, or do so incompletely or improperly, the Com-
mission may sue the Member State pursuant to Article 169.
20. 2J.O. 32 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1974, IX, at 3.
21. 2J.O. 36 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1974, IX, at 7.
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Council directives adopted in the 1960s and early 1970s dealt
principally with agricultural, corporate or commercial activi-
ties. 22 Although the Commission proposed many draft direc-
tives for professions, these languished at the stage of examina-
tion by the Council because of perceived serious differences
among the Member States as to the proper levels of profes-
sional education or training and the scope of professional ac-
tivities .23
A pair of influential Court of Justice judgments in 1974
broke this log-jam. In Jean Reyners v. Belgium,24 the Court sur-
prised the Commission and the Member States by holding that
Article 52 on the right of professional establishment was di-
rectly effective in part and hence granted some rights that pro-
fessionals could enforce. In Johannes Henricus Maria van Bin-
sbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrjfsvereniging voor de Metaalniverheid
("van Binsbergen"),25 the Court likewise held that Article 59 on
the right of professional services had direct effect.
Mr. Reyners, a Dutch national, had successfully obtained a
Belgian legal diploma and the other credentials necessary to
acquire the status of an avocat in Belgium. Nonetheless, the
22. Council Directive No. 64/221 on the co-ordination of special measures con-
cerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health, 7J.O. 850 (1964), O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1963-1964, at 117, limited the power of Member States to deny residence
permits or to expel self-employed persons and employees on the grounds noted
above. The directive has principally been applied in cases involving employees, nota-
bly, Roland Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219,
[1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140. Also important is the Council Directive No. 73/148 of May
21, 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Com-
munity for nationals of Member States in regard to establishment and the provision
of services, 0.J. L 172/14 (1973). In addition to adopting these general directives,
the Council adopted a large number of directives addressed to rights of establish-
ment or the supply of services in the fields of agriculture, handicrafts, hotels and
restaurants, mining, motion picture production, and the retail trade. The Council
also passed initial directives in the important fields of company law, banking and
insurance. See generally KAPrEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 16; LASOK,
supra note 18; SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 18, art. 54 ann.
23. See generally Rolf Waegenbaur, Free Movement in the Professions: The New EEC
Proposal on Professional Qualifications, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 91, 92-97 (1986).
24. Case 2/74, [1974] E.C.R. 631, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305.
25. Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298 [hereinafter van
Binsbergen]. In dealing with parallel issues, the U.S. Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire could not impose a residence requirement as a bar to an otherwise quali-
fied Vermont lawyer seeking to practice in New Hampshire. New Hampshire v.
Piper, 420 U.S. 274 (1985).
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Brussels bar declined to admit Mr. Reyners on the grounds
that a Belgian law required Belgian citizenship as a condition
for the status of avocat. The Belgian Conseil d'Etat (supreme ad-
ministrative court);, to which Mr. Reyners appealed his unsuc-
cessful application, referred several questions to the Court of
Justice in an Article 177 proceeding. 6
The Court's opinion in Reyners deals with two issues in re-
sponse to questions posed by the Conseil d'Etat: first, whether
Article 52 is directly effective, giving immediate rights to mem-
bers of professions; second, whether there is a basis to except
the profession of avocat from Article 52 by virtue of Article 55's
"official authority" limitation. As this second question relates
specifically to lawyers, we will reserve it for discussion in Part
IV hereafter.
The Court of Justice took its starting point in Article 7 of
the Treaty, which is part of the Treaty's chapter on basic prin-
ciples. Article 7 states that in any specific application of the
Treaty, "any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited." The Court observed that Article 52 contained a
clause enabling professionals to be self-employed in another
Member State "under the conditions laid down for its own na-
tionals," obviously an application of the principle of non-dis-
crimination. The Court then concluded that, to the extent it
incorporated the basic "rule of equal treatment with nation-
als," Article 52 could be deemed directly effective, giving im-
mediate rights to all professionals. 7
The Court held that the references to implementing direc-
tives under Article 54 and directives for the mutual recognition
of diplomas under Article 57 did not make the adoption of
such directives a precondition to the direct effect of Article 52.
The Court stated that "the rule of national treatment" is effec-
tive even if the Council had failed in its obligation to pass these
implementing directives. Directives are still desirable, how-
ever, because they can "promote the effective exercise of the
26. Under EEC Treaty Article 177, any Member State court or tribunal may re-
fer questions concerning the Treaty or secondary Community legislation to the
Court ofJustice whenever an answer is relevant in a proceeding before that court or
tribunal. The Court ofJustice's responses are not only binding on the court or tribu-
nal which referred the question; they are also guidelines for the interpretation of
Community law binding on all other courts or tribunals.
27. Reyners, [1974] E.C.R. at 651-52, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 327.
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right of freedom of establishment. '28
It is thus obvious that Mr. Reyners could rely upon the
Treaty principle of non-discrimination to obtain his admission
to the Brussels bar, because a requirement of Belgian citizen-
ship violates that principle.
By a felicitous coincidence, later in the same year in van
Binsbergen the Court of Justice had to answer questions raised
by a Dutch administrative tribunal with respect to the direct
effect and scope of Article 59 on the right to provide services.
Mr. van Binsbergen's lawyer was Mr. Kortmann, not a Dutch
advocaat, but rather a Dutch legal representative authorized to
handle matters before administrative authorities. However, he
moved to.Belgium. Solely on the basis that Mr. Kortmann was
no longer a Dutch resident, the Dutch authorities refused to
permit him to continue legal representation of his client in
Dutch administrative proceedings.
In an analysis of Article 59 essentially parallel to that made
of Article 52 in Reyners, the Court held that the principle of
non-discrimination incorporated in Article 59 made that article
also directly effective.2 9 The reference in Article 63 to imple-
menting directives in no way conditioned the direct effect of
Article 59. Hence, the Netherlands could not require an other-
wise qualified legal representative to be a resident (thus "de-
priving Article 59 of all useful effect"), 30 any more than
Belgium could require an avocat to be a citizen.
The doctrinal importance of Reyners and van Binsbergen is
great indeed. If the application of the doctrine of direct effect
had been rejected by the Court, Articles 52 and 59 in essence
would have remained only abstract theoretical provisions, and
professionals would have acquired rights only as and when the
Council of Ministers might pass directives. Instead, the
Court's holdings meant that every professional within the
Community has, by direct effect of these Treaty articles, at
least the right to be treated without discrimination by host
state authorities.
Still, this is only a limited application of Articles 52 and
59. Before claiming a right either to perform services or to
28. Id. at 652, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 327.
29. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. at 1311-12, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 314.
30. Id. at 1309, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 312.
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practice as a resident in a host state, the Community profes-
sional must prove that his or her other qualifications or cre-
dentials are substantially equal to those required for the com-
parable host country professional.
Obviously, this makes the passage of implementing direc-
tives under Articles 54, 57 and 63 still crucial for most profes-
sionals. However, the opinions in Reyners and van Binsbergen
served as a catalyst for Commission and Council action. The
Commission first withdrew its draft directives for re-examina-
tion in the light of these opinions. It then made new proposals
and the Council finally started passing directives of major im-
portance to specific professions.
The breakthrough came for the medical profession with
two directives of June 16, 1975. One directive established
minimum standards for medical education and the awarding of
medical diplomas in all Member States.3 1 The second directive
then required the mutual recognition of these diplomas and
granted a right of free movement for services and establish-
ment to medical doctors who possess the diplomas.3 2 Because
it was estimated that the Community had over 500,000 doctors
at the time of passage of these directives, they obviously had a
major impact. The Council adopted similar directives subse-
quently with regard to nurses, dentists, and veterinarians in
the late 1970s and pharmacists in 1985." A further success
was the 1985 directive granting mutual recognition of educa-
tional diplomas for architects, with the consequent right of
performance of services and establishment throughout the
31. Council Directive No. 75/363 concerning the coordination of provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of doctors,
O.J. L 167/14 (1975). For a description of this and all other medical and accessory
profession directives, see LAsoK, supra note 18, at 151-60.
32. Council Directive No. 75/362 concerning the mutual recognition of diplo-
mas, certificates, and other evidence of formal qualifications in medicine, including
measures to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom
to provide services, O.J. L 167/1 (1975).
33. Regarding nurses, see Council Directive No. 77/452, O.J. L 176/1 (1977)
and Council Directive No. 77/453, O.J. L 176/8 (1977) (affecting over 700,000
nurses). Regarding dentists, see Council Directive No. 78/686, O.J. L 233/1 (1978)
and Council Directive No. 78/687, O.J. L 233/10 (1978). Regarding veterinarians,
see Council Directive No. 78/1026, OJ. L 362/1 (1978) and Council Directive No.
78/1027, O.J. L 362/7 (1978). Regarding pharmacists, see Council Directive No.
85/432, OJ. L 253/34 (1985) and Council Directive No. 85/433, O.J. L 253/37
(1985).
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E.C. for that profession.34
The basic approach of these directives (except that for ar-
chitects) is first, to harmonize the professional education and
training standards throughout the Community, thus makingit
relatively easy for Member States to accept foreign Community
professionals. The directives effectively set a basic floor of
qualifications for all members of the profession in question.
The principle of non-discrimination then enables their eligibil-
ity to practice on a permanent basis in any E.C. country.
For example, the first directive for the medical profession
set forth the basic fields of study and training essential to be-
coming a doctor, and then set a minimum educational and
training period of six years or 5500 hours of theoretical and
practical instruction, including hospital experience. The direc-
tive went on to specify additional requirements for specialties
such as neurosurgery, orthopaedics, and internal medicine.
The second directive for the medical profession required
Member States to accept the diplomas of higher educational
institutions in other Member States, thus permitting a foreign-
trained doctor to practice freely as a permanent resident in a
host Member State. It is worthy of note that this directive does
not permit the host state to require proof of fluency in the host
language-it is pragmatically assumed that the foreign profes-
sional will not be able to successfully attract clients or deal with
them without such fluency.
Although this bifurcated approach first used for the medi-
cal profession was employed successfully for nurses, dentists,
veterinarians and pharmacists, it suffers from two serious
problems. First, it requires a very long period of time for the
Commission to elaborate a commonly accepted course of stud-
ies and training for any particular profession, and then to ob-
tain the Council's acceptance of the standards (e.g., for phar-
macists, this process took fifteen years from the initial Com-
mission draft directive).
34. Council Directive No. 85/384, O.J. L 223/15 (1985). The directive on archi-
tects is much less precise concerning minimum standards for education and training
of architects than those directives governing the various medical professions.
Although article 3 does list some general fields of study and article 4 requires a mini-
mum of four years of full-time studies at the university level, each Member State is
required to recognize the diplomas of other Member States on a basis of mutual
trust.
L4 WYERS' RIGHTS
Second, for some professions the substantive materials
covered in the education, training, and scope of professional
activities vary widely from state to state. This is notably true
for the legal profession, given the obvious fundamental differ-
ences between the common law and civil law systems, and the
profound differences in approach even within the civil law
world. Moreover, the nature and scope of the various
branches of the legal profession is quite diverse within the E.C.
Thus by the early 1980s, the pace of progress in attaining
the rights of professionals to practice freely throughout the
E.C. was seen to be too slow. A new approach was necessary.
This issue was caught up in a broader movement. In the
early 1980s a feeling of "Europessimism" had developed as a
result of sluggish progress in many fields, as well as frequent
controversies and stalemates in the legislative process.
Responding to this situation, the European Council of
Heads of Government at Fontainebleau in June 1984 adopted
the "People's Europe Program" that, among other things,
urged the development of a method for universally recogniz-
ing higher education diplomas.3 - The European Council re-
quested the Commission to prepare a study on attaining the
goals of the "People's Europe Program."
The Commission's response came in a section of the
White Paper.3 6 The Commission proposed a draft directive for
a general system of recognition of higher education diplomas.
This measure then became one of the key parts of the "Peo-
ple's Europe Program," itself now subsumed into the goal of
completing the internal market by 1992.
The directive's final passage, somewhat modified, on De-
cember 21, 1988 a3 represents one of the major achievements
of the "People's Europe Program." However, because the fo-
cus of this Article is on lawyers' rights, we will defer coverage
35. See the summary of the June 25-26, '1984 Fontainebleau meeting and the
"People's Europe Program" in 17 EUR. COMM. BULL., No. 6, at 11 (1984). The Euro-
pean Council of Heads of Government of the E.C. countries has met at least twice
annually since 1972 and addresses major long-term policy and political issues. The
status of the European Council was formally recognized in Title I of the Single Euro-
pean Act, supra note 6.
36. White Paper, supra note 5, 93.
37. Diploma Directive, supra note 7, O.J. L 19/16 (1989).
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of this directive until Part V and turn instead to lawyers' rights
to provide services.
III. RULES ON LA WYERS' FREEDOM
TO PROVIDE SERVICES
The 1974 Court of Justice judgment in van Binsbergen es-
tablished the rule that Articles 59 and 60 had direct effect, so
that lawyers and other professionals have a right to provide
services in other states (host states) on a basis of national treat-
ment. 8 Prior to van Binsbergen, the Commission had been
working on a draft directive to enable lawyers to provide serv-
ices throughout the Community. The Commission modified
the draft text to accord with certain aspects of the van Bin-
sbergen judgment and the Council of Ministers adopted the di-
rective after a relatively short review.
The directive on lawyers' freedom to provide services was
adopted on March 22, 1977. 3' The directive constitutes the
legal framework which governs Community lawyers' rights to
provide services in other states.
The directive first defines the class of legal professionals
entitled to perform services throughout the Community. In ar-
ticle 1, the directive lists, state by state, the regulated legal pro-
fession that customarily provides courtroom services, such as
the avocat in France, the Rechtsanwalt in Germany, and the avvo-
cato in Italy. For the United Kingdom and Ireland, the list in-
cludes not only barristers, who plead before higher courts, but
also solicitors, who can plead before some lower courts, but
who chiefly provide general corporate and commercial serv-
ices.
It is noteworthy that the directive does not define the na-
ture of the legal services that a lawyer may perform in a host
state. Article 1 (1) does expressly enable host states to "reserve
38. Van Binsbergen, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298.
39. Council Directive No. 77/249 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of
freedom to provide services, O.J. L 78/17 (1977) [hereinafter Lawyers Directive].
The directive is reprinted as an appendix to this Article. The directive is discussed
extensively in LAGUE-rrE, supra note 1, at 241-48, and in SPEDDING, supra note 1, at
185-200. The directive's scope and effect is also described in Louis Pettiti, La Direc-
tive sur la Libre Prestation de Services des Activitis dAvocats, 1977 R. DU MARCH9 COMMUN
239, and Peter S. Wilson, Recent Development, EEC: Freedom to Provide Services for
EEC Lawyers, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 379 (1978).
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to prescribed categories of lawyers the preparation of formal
documents" in the administration of decedents' estates or the
transfer of real estate interests. By implication, this would sug-
gest that lawyers from the listed classes may perform any other
legal services in the host state, whether courtroom or adminis-
trative agency practice, or corporate or commercial counsel-
ing, negotiation, or drafting.
Presumably, article 1(1) allows states to reserve estate ad.-
ministration and real estate title transfers to "categories of law-
yers" because in most civil law states these activities are the
monopoly of a separate legal profession, known as notaries (in
France, the notaire, in Germany, the Notar, etc.). Note that arti-
cle 1(2) does not include notaries in the list of lawyers entitled
to provide cross-border services. Although notaries are per-
haps less apt to be interested in transactions outside their own
state than are commercial lawyers, that is not always true: con-
sider, for example, a notary who would like to handle an estate
with assets in several' states, or the sale of all of an entity's real
property located in several states. The omission of notaries
from the scope of the directive is accordingly curious and ap-
pears to be without objective justification.
Another surprising omission is the legal profession of con-
seiljuridique, in France, especially because it became a regulated
profession by law in 1971.40 A conseiljuridique is extensively en-
gaged in commercial practice and might well want to provide
cross-border services. The issue as to the French conseil
juridique has become moot, because the 1990 French law has
merged the professions of avocat and conseiljuridique. However,
there exist professional legal advisors equivalent to the conseil
juridique in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and other
states, and these are also not listed in article 1(2). This omis-
sion also does not appear to be objectively justified because
legal advisors can claim rights to perform certain cross-border
services under Article 59-recall that in van Binsbergen, the pro-
fessional involved in the Dutch administrative proceeding was
a Dutch legal representative, not an advocaat.
Article 3 of the directive states an important rule: in per-
forming the cross-border services, the lawyer must use his or
40. For a description of the French conseiljuridique law of December 30, 1971,
see Goebel, supra note 1, at 464-69.
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her home title. This article was clearly intended to prevent
both inadvertent confusion with a host state professional, and
any lawyer's attempt to deceive clients by passing himself or
herself off as a local lawyer.
Article 5 sets a limit on cross-border practice in "legal
proceedings" (this is not a defined term, but it apparently re-
fers to civil and criminal litigation before courts). The host
state may require the foreign lawyer to be formally introduced
to the presiding judge and the president of the local bar and
"to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practices before the
judicial authority in question and who would, where necessary,
be answerable to that authority."
By implication from article 5, a lawyer providing any other
form of cross-border services, such as negotiation assistance,
drafting of commercial, financial or other documents, or coun-
seling on legal or tax matters, need not be associated with a
host state lawyer.
Under article 6, if the host state does not permit its do-
mestic house counsel to engage in "activities relating to ...
legal proceedings," the host state can likewise exclude foreign
house counsel from such litigation activities.
The directive does not attempt to set any time limit onthe
duration of the services provided in the host state. Presuma-
bly, the limit is set by the nature of the services provided. A
lengthy court administrative proceeding, negotiations and
drafting of a major acquisition or a complex financial arrange-
ment might require a lawyer's temporary residence in the host
state for months-remember that Treaty Article 60 permits
temporary residence. However, at some point the regular pro-
vision of services without a specific time duration from a local
residence or office would constitute a local establishment, and
become subject to Article 52, not Article 57. We will return to
this topic in Part VII.A below.
Article 4 of the directive sets out a complicated formula to
determine the rules of conduct applicable to the lawyer provid-
ing services. Article 4(2) states that if the services involve legal
proceedings or proceedings before public authorities, the rules
of professional conduct of the host state are to be observed,
but "without prejudice" to those of the home state of the for-
eign lawyer. For all other legal services (e.g., standard com-
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mercial or corporate practice), the rules of the home state are
to apply, albeit "without prejudice" to the application of sev-
eral important host state rules, notably those on "professional
secrecy, relations with other lawyers, the prohibition on the
same lawyer acting for parties with mutually conflicting inter-
ests, and publicity." However, these latter home state rules
only apply if they meet an objective necessity standard: "their
observance [must be] objectively justified to ensure, in that
[host] state, the proper exercise of a lawyer's activities, the
standing of the profession and respect for the rules concerning
incompatibility." 4'
Article 4's complexity is an attempt to apply certain princi-
ples of van Binsbergen. The Court there said that the host state
could require the person providing a cross-border service to
follow "professional rules justified by the general good-in
particular, rules relating to organization, professional ethics,
supervision and liability."'42 (The concept that cross-border
providers of services can be subjected to host state rules "justi-
fied by the general good" also applies to commercial and fi-
nancial services.) 43
Although, fortunately, no conflicts between host and
home professional rules have been brought thus far to the
Court ofJustice, there is certainly a significant risk of such con-
flicts. Member State professional rules for lawyers vary consid-
erably as to the permissibility of contingent fees; the applica-
tion of fixed fee rates to various services; the right to sue for
fees; the handling of client funds; the necessity for professional
insurance and its scope; the permissibility of advertising or
other public relations; the extent of the attorney-client privi-
lege or professional secrecy; and the nature and extent of con-
flict of interest rules.44
The Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the Euro-
41. For a discussion of the complexity and uncertainty of the text in article 4, see
LAGUETrE, supra note 1, at 246-47, and SPEDDING, supra note 1, at 187-90.
42. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. at 1309, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 312.
43. Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 69 [hereinafter German Insurance]; Criminal Proceedings Against Alfred
John Webb, Case 279/80, [1981] E.C.R. 3305, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
44. See L.AGUETrE, supra note 1, at 78-90 (reviewing differences in national rules
of professional conduct and ethics, notably concerning conflict of interest); id. at 139-
56 (concerning confidential communications and professional secrecy); id. at 157-67
(concerning fees).
1991-19921
580 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:556
pean Community, a coordinating group for all the national bar
associations in the Community, adopted on October 16, 1977
the Declaration of Perugia on the Principles of Professional
Conduct.4 5 This Declaration was meant to be a starting point
with respect to the choice of law rules to apply in case of con-
flict. For example, as to the duty of confidentiality, it suggests
that the stricter rule should be applied, while with respect to
the rules of publicity, it suggests that the host state rules
should apply.
In the 1980s, the CCBE continued its efforts to establish
certain basic principles which would be common to all national
professional rules of conduct and ethics when applied to cross-
border practice. These efforts were crowned with a notewor-
thy achievement, the Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the Eu-
ropean Community of October 28, 1988 ("CCBE Code" or
"Code of Conduct").46 The CCBE Code is appropriately the
subject of analysis by a CCBE expert, John Toulmin, later in
this special issue.4" The CCBE Code should reduce apprecia-
bly the risk of serious conflict between host and home state
rules as applied to a lawyer providing cross-border services.
Further comments on the CCBE Code are made in Parts VII.A
and VIII.
The 1977 Lawyers Directive has been the subject of three
Court of Justice judgments. In two cases, the Commission
brought an action against a Member State under Article 169 of
the Treaty because the state had improperly implemented the
directive. The more important judgment is Commission v. Ger-
many,48 a 1988 decision.
The German practice in implementing the 1977 directive
45. The Declaration of Perugia is set forth in full and analyzed, section by sec-
tion, in LAGUETrE, supra note 1, at 255-58, and is discussed in SPEDDING, supra note 1,
at 195-200.
46. A CCBE plenary session unanimously adopted the Code at Strasbourg,
France. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1988) [here-
inafter CCBE CODE]. The full text is set out at John Toulmin Q.C., A Worldwide Com-
mon Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673 app. (1991-1992).
47. Toulmin, supra note 46.
48. Case 427/85, [1988] E.C.R. 1123, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 677 (noted by Profes-
sorJulian Lonbay in Cross-Frontier Provision of Services by Lawyers, 13 EUR. L. REV. 347
(1989) and Valerie Pease in Commission v. Germany, 22 INT'L LAW. 543 (1988)); see
Horst Eidenmiiller, Deregulating the Market for Legal Services in the European Community:
Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services for EC Lawyers in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 53 MOD. L. REV. 604 (1990).
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had been to require that the foreign lawyer providing services
in litigation or in certain administrative proceedings always
collaborate with a German lawyer, and that the German lawyer
assume the primary role of "authorized representative or de-
fending counsel." Moreover, the local German lawyer had to
be present at all times during the court or administrative pro-
ceedings or when the foreign lawyer sought to visit a client in
jail.
The Court initially held that there was no obligation for a
foreign lawyer to work "in conjunction with" a host state law-
yer in any judicial or administrative proceeding if the host state
law did not mandate that a party be represented by a lawyer in
that sort of proceeding. 49 This ruling effectively eliminated the
need for a client to pay the expense of a host state lawyer when
the client chooses to be represented solely by a foreign lawyer
in such proceedings.
The Court of Justice then ruled that the above-described
German requirements were excessive and were not necessary
when a foreign lawyer seeks to work "in conjunction with" a
host state lawyer. The Court specifically held that article 5 of
the 1977 directive, which refers to the local lawyer as being
"answerable" to the host state court, did not imply that the
local lawyer had to be the "authorised representative or de-
fending counsel" or that he or she must take the leading role
in drafting pleadings or in oral argument, or necessarily be
continuously present during the court proceedings. 50 The for-
eign and local lawyer should decide upon their respective roles
in a "form of co-operation appropriate to their client's instruc-
tions.'"51
The Court also rejected the German contention that for-
eign lawyers acting without the full cooperation of host coun-
sel might have an insufficient knowledge of the rules of sub-
stantive and procedural law. The Court referred to knowledge
of German law as "part of the responsibility of the lawyer pro-
viding services vis-A-vis his client, who is free to entrust his in-
terests to a lawyer of his choice."'52 This is a particularly inter-
49. Germany, [1988] E.C.R. at 1157-59, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 702-04.
50. Id. at 1160-63, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 704-07.
51. Id. at 1161, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 706.
52. Id. at 1162, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. at 706.
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esting point, as it appears to imply that a host state may not
compel a foreign lawyer engaged in standard commercial prac-
tice to be associated with a home state lawyer when the foreign
lawyer provides an opinion on host state law, even when, as -in
Germany, the national law grants a monopoly on counseling
on domestic law to local lawyers.53
The final issue concerned Germany's ability to apply its
long-standing rule that only lawyers who reside within a spe-
cific territory may plead before certain higher courts in that
territory. Germany contended that to allow foreign lawyers to
plead in such courts (as opposed to association with a locally
admitted lawyer who would plead) would allow foreign lawyers
greater rights than German lawyers from other areas of Ger-
many and thereby constitute reverse discrimination. Although
the directive did not cover this point, the Court held that the
"rule of territorial exclusivity cannot be applied to activities of
a temporary nature" by the foreign service-providing lawyer,
because a contrary view would frustrate the goal of Articles 59
and 60.
In Commission v. France,55 a 1991 judgment, the Court came
to the same conclusion in striking down French rules requiring
foreign lawyers to work "in conjunction with" French avocats in
proceedings in which a client was not required by French law
to be represented by an avocat, as well as in forbidding the
French limits on foreign lawyers' services based on French
rules on territorial admission to practice before certain courts.
The final Court judgment that merits attention came in a
curious case, Claude Gullung v. Conseils de l'ordre des avocats du
barreau de Colmar et de Saverne ("Gullung"),56 a 1988 decision.
53. Rolf Waegenbaur, supra note 23, at 96, considers that the 1977 directive
enables a foreign lawyer to advise clients on the host state law as well as home state
law or Community law. Philippa Watson in a note on Klopp, 22 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 736, 750 (1985), comes to the same conclusion. Foreign lawyers who provide
advice on complex issues of host state law without consulting an expert host state
lawyer may, of course, run a risk of malpractice liability in case of error.
54. Commission v. Germany, Case 427/85, [1988] E.C.R. 1123, 1165-66, [1989]
2 C.M.L.R. 677, 709.
55. Case C-294/89 (Eur. Ct. J. July 10, 1991) (not yet reported). An English
summary of the French text, which is available at the Court, appeared in WEEKLY
PROC. OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 14/91, at 10.
56. Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57 [hereinafter Gullung]
(noted by Professor Julian Lonbay in Free Movement for Professionals, 13 EUR. L. REV.
275 (1988)).
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Mr. Gullung, a French and German dual national, was a notaire
in France from 1947 to 1966, but resigned after a disciplinary
proceeding. Mr. Gullung later applied to become a conseil
juridique and an avocat, but was unsuccessful in both applica-
tions because the respective professional associations found
that he lacked "the guarantees of dignity, good repute and in-
tegrity necessary to practice as an avocat."'5 7 Mr. Gullung then
became a Rechtsanwalt in Offenburg, Germany in 1979. Shortly
thereafter, he opened an office in Mulhouse, France, describ-
ing himself with the unusual title ofjurisconsulte, and apparently
practiced for several years without incident.
In 1985, after Mr. Gullung attempted to appear in a Col-
mar court in conjunction with a Colmar avocat, the Colmar bar
council forbid any of its avocats from "lending assistance" to
anyone who had been denied registration as an avocat on the
grounds for which Mr. Gullung had been denied registration.
Mr. Gullung sued to set aside the Colmar bar action, which
ultimately resulted in the Colmar Court of Appeal's referral of
questions to the Court of Justice in an Article 177 proceeding.
One of the questions related to the right of establishment and
will be covered in Part IV, but the other related to the provi-
sion of services.
,The Court of Justice cited article 4 of the 1977 directive
and approved its language requiring that a lawyer providing
services in "legal proceedings" in a host state observe the pro-
fessional rules of conduct in that state. The Court then held
that a person who had been denied access to the profession of
courtroom lawyer in the host state "for reasons relating to dig-
nity, good repute and integrity" must be considered to lack the
"capacity" to satisfy the host state's professional rules.5" The
Court rejected an argument that the directive only required
the foreign lawyer to satisfy the host state's professional rules
in connection with the legal proceeding in which the foreign
lawyer seeks to provide services.59
The Court's rationale is not totally satisfying. The issue in
this part of the case involved the provision of services, not es-
tablishment. The German bar in Offenburg presumably had
57. Gullung, [1988] E.C.R. at 113, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 70.
58. Id. at 138, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 73.
59. Id.
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decided that Mr. Gullung was of the requisite good character
to become a Rechtsanwalt. Accordingly, so long as he complied
with the French rules of conduct in the course of providing
services temporarily in France, why should he be denied the
right to provide the services? Recall that Mr. Gullung at-
tempted to appear in French court in conjunction with a quali-
fied French avocat, who is supposed to "be answerable" to the
French court, in terms of article 5 *of the 1977 directive.
Would not the French avocat serve as an effective guarantor
that Mr. Gullung would satisfy the French rules during the
court proceeding? The Court's statement that Mr. Gullung
lacked the "capacity" to satisfy French professional rules
amounts to a conclusion that his character is somehow perma-
nently tainted, which hardly seems to be a psychologically jus-
tifiable conclusion. 60
Moreover, if the Colmar bar council suspected that Mr.
Gullung had somehow misled the Offenburg authorities as to
his past when applying to become Rechtsanwalt, the Colmar bar
council should so advise the Offenburg authorities, which
could make their own investigation and take any appropriate
disciplinary action. One wonders if sufficient respect has been
given to the autonomous decision of the Offenburg bar con-
cerning Mr. Gullung's capacity to be a Rechtsanwalt.
If the Court had an underlying concern that Mr. Gullung
was not simply trying to perform services temporarily, but was
trying to establish himself in France while evading the French
rules (as his title ofjurisconsulte and office in Mulhouse might
suggest), then the Court needed only to refer to part of its
opinion in van Binsbergen. The Court there held that a host
state could prevent a foreign lawyer's activities when these are
60. It is interesting to note the Court's treatment of analogous issues in the sec-
tor of the free movement of workers. Directive 64/221 of February 25, 1964 requires
that Member States take actions restricting rights of entry and residence based "ex-
clusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned" and forbids action
based exclusively on past criminal convictions. See Council Directive No. 64/221,
supra note 22, art. 3, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-1964, at 118. In Regina v. Secretary of
State for Home Affairs, ex parte Mario Santillo, Case 131/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1585,
1602-03, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 308, 329, the Court accordingly held that the United
Kingdom could not deport a Community national who had been convicted of rape
and imprisoned for five years without holding a new hearing at the time of his release
from prison to consider any new factors, because the original deportation order had
occurred at the time of the penal conviction.
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"entirely or principally directed toward its territory" and
designed "for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of
conduct that would be applicable to him if he were established
within that [host] state."61
This concludes the review of a lawyer's right to provide
services. It is clear that the 1977 directive, together with the
Court's generally expansive interpretation of Articles 59 and
60, go a long way toward facilitating the temporary provision
of legal services throughout the Community. The two Article
169 judgments demonstrate that Member States must enable
the provision of legal services to be carried out in a liberal
manner. The principal problem area that remains is that of
potential conflicts between the rules of professional conduct of
home and host states, and the CCBE Code at least alleviates
the problem. We will, however, return to certain unresolved
issues in connection with the provision of services in Part
VII.A.
IV. LA WYERS' RIGHT OF PROFESSIONAL
ESTA BLISHMENT
The right of establishment is obviously more far-reaching
than the right to provide cross-border services. Article 52 sets
forth explicitly three different aspects of the right of establish-
ment: (1) the right to set up "agencies, branches or subsidiar-
ies," (2) "the right to take up and pursue activities as self-em-
ployed persons," and (3) the right to "set up and manage un-
dertakings, in particular companies or firms."
Article 52 contains a fundamental condition, namely that
the foreign person or entity receive national treatment, i.e., be
subject to whatever conditions are laid down for comparable
national persons or entities of the host state. Because these
conditions tend to be quite diverse and often difficult for the
foreign person or entity to satisfy, this can prove to be a seri-
ous barrier to free establishment in many fields, notably the
corporate and financial sectors.
As a result, the Community has undertaken major pro-
grams for the harmonization of national laws in the corporate,
securities, banking and insurance sectors. These programs
61. Van Binsbergen, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, 1309, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R.
298, 312.
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have received added impetus in the context of completing the
internal market, and each program is now close to comple-
12tion.
For professional activity, as indicated before, there is an
additional hurdle in seeking to obtain establishment rights, be-
cause states usually require an educational diploma and fre-
quently completion of a professional training period before a
license to practice a profession is conferred. For this reason,
the Community undertook its program to harmonize national
laws on higher education and training and to achieve the mu-
tual recognition of diplomas and certificates for certain profes-
sions, discussed in Parts II and V.
For lawyers, all three aspects of the right of establishment
in Article 52 are of interest. We turn initially to the Court of
Justice case law dealing with the first aspect (the right to set up
a branch) and the second aspect (the activity as a self-employed
person).6" The Court has not had occasion to deal with the
third aspect, the right to set up firms or companies, but there is
no reason to doubt that a foreign lawyer or law firm may set up
or join a professional partnership or civil or commercial com-
pany for the practice of law in the host state on the same condi-
tions that prevail for host state lawyers.
62. As of the end of 1991, the Community had adopted over 30 harmonization
directives in the corporate and financial services sector. Most of the company and
securities law directives were in fact adopted before the launching of the internal
market program, but little progress was made before 1985 in the banking and insur-
ance fields. In paragraphs 101 to 107 of the White Paper, supra note 5, the Commis-
sion stressed the need for financial integration and proposed that further harmoniza-
tion be based on the principle of "mutual recognition" of standards and "home
country control" of financial institutions engaged in cross-border services, especially
through branch establishments. A number of important directives, notably the sec-
ond Council Directive No. 89/646 of December 15, 1989 on the coordination of laws
•.. relating to... the business of credit institutions, O.J. L 386/1 (1989) [hereinafter
Second Banking Directive], were based on the approach of "home country control"
and "mutual recognition." For a general overview, see WINTER ET AL., supra note 6.
See also Manning Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Law: The Achievements of
the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185 (1990); George Zavvos, Banking Inte-
gration and 1992: Legal Issues and Policy Implications, 31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 463 (1990).
63. The earlier Court ofJustice judgments on the lawyers' right of establishment
are reviewed in LAGUETrE, supra note 1, at 215-69; SPEDDING, supra note 1, at 146-47;
Todd Michael Saunders, The EEC and the USA: Will the Gates Be Opened for American Law
Firms in 1992?, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 191 (1989); Bernhard Schloh, Freedom of
Movement of Lawyers Within the European Economic Community, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.
REV. 83 (1990); Jacqueline Friedlander, Note, Securing a Lawyer's Freedom of Establish-
ment within the European Economic Community, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 733 (1987).
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The landmark 1974 judgment, Reyners,64 already discussed
in Part II regarding its holding that Article 52 has direct ef-
fect,65 remains the seminal opinion for a lawyer's right of es-
tablishment. Belgian law had required Belgian citizenship as a
prerequisite for the status of Belgian avocat (a common prereq-
uisite in many states). The Court held that such a condition
would frustrate the right of establishment and that Article 52,
read together with Article 7's basic principle of non-discrimi-
nation on the basis of nationality, forbids such a condition.
Another important aspect of the judgment dealt with the
interpretation of Article 55's exception to the right of estab-
lishment for "activities . . . connected, even occasionally, with
the exercise of official authority." Belgium, supported by Ger-
many and Luxembourg, argued that avocats, in their role as the
only persons authorized to plead in litigation before Belgian
courts, were so connected.
The Court initially held that Article 55, as an exception to
a fundamental Treaty right, must be read narrowly, and should
not remove an entire profession from the right of establish-
ment.6 It then held that the
most typical activities of the profession of avocat, such as
consultation and legal assistance and also representation
and the defense of parties in court, even when the interven-
tion or assistance of the avocat is compulsory or is a legal
monopoly, cannot be considered as connected with the ex-
ercise of official authority.67
It is generally assumed that Article 55's exception would
cover judges, public prosecutors, and others involved in the
administration of justice, as well as avocats when acting tempo-
rarily as judges or prosecutors. 6  On the other hand, if the
typical activities of avocats are not connected with the "exercise
of official authority," it is incontestable that neither are the typ-
64. Case 2/74, [1974] E.C.R. 631, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
66. Reyners, [1974] E.C.R. at 654, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 328.
67. Id. at 655, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 329.
68. Advocate General Mayras contended in his opinion that judges, lawyers em-
ployed by the state, and lawyers acting temporarily as judges should be considered as
exercising "official authority." Id. at 667-68, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 322-23. For a
careful analysis of the concept of "official authority," see LAGUETrE, supra note 1, at
215-26.
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ical activities of solicitors, legal advisors or representatives, no-
taries, tax consultants, patent or trademark agents, and so
forth.
A striking parallel to Reyners is the U.S. Supreme Court
opinion in In re Griffiths,69 which held that Connecticut could
not make U.S. citizenship a prerequisite for the status of attor-
ney, rejecting the argument that this condition was justified be-
cause attorneys are "officers of the court." Grijfiths was, in fact,
decided only a few months before Reyners, and the Supreme
Court's reasoning may have influenced the Court of Justice."
Reyners's impact was substantially enhanced by the Court
of Justice's 1977 judgment in Jean Thieffry v. Conseil de l'ordre des
avocats d la cour de Paris.7' Mr. Thieffry was a Belgian avocat,
who practiced in Brussels from 1956-1969, and then moved to
Paris. In 1974, the University of Paris recognized Mr. Thief-
fry's Belgian law degree as the equivalent of a French law de-
gree, apparently for the purpose of establishing his capacity to
take the French bar examination (the CAPA). He then success-
fully passed the French bar examination in 1975. Based on the
University of Paris recognition of equivalency and his passage
of the bar examination, Mr. Thieffry applied to the Paris bar
council for admission to the Paris bar. The Paris bar council
denied him admission on the basis that he had not received any
French law degree, as required by the French law regulating
the profession of avocat. On appeal, the Paris Court of Appeal
referred questions under Article 177 to the Court of Justice.
The Court held that France could not require a French law
degree as a prerequisite to becoming an avocat whenever an
applicant has received an equivalent legal education in another
Community state. The Court reasoned that, because freedom
of establishment is a principal Community goal, Member
States have a duty under Article 5 of the Treaty, which requires
states to take "all appropriate measures . . . to ensure fulfill-
ment of [Treaty] obligations," to place restrictions on the free-
69. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
70. For an interesting discussion of the parallels between Giffiths and Reyners
and the cross-fertilization of ideas involved, see TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE,
supra note 1, at 7-11 and SPEDDING, supra note 1, at 211-13. Ms. Spedding also states
that Gnffiths may have influenced the 1974 amendment to the United Kingdom Solici-
tors Act, which eliminated the citizenship requirement for solicitors. Id. at 213.
71. Case 71/76, [1977] E.C.R. 765, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 373.
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dom of establishment only when "justified by the general
good."72
In that perspective, to require a French law degree is an
"unjustified restriction" when an appropriate university au-
thority has determined that a law degree from an institution in
another Community state can be regarded as the equivalent of
a French law degree.73 Note that the Court went rather far in
its conclusion, because it denied the Paris bar council any dis-
cretion to second-guess the determination by the University of
Paris which, of course, has no customary role in the process of
passing on qualifications for an avocat.
A European university often recognizes foreign law diplo-
mas as equivalent to domestic ones for the purpose of permit-
ting a student to enroll in a postgraduate degree program.
Hence a foreign law student or lawyer who pursues postgradu-
ate education in a host state can usually escape an obligation
for an undergraduate law degree in that state as a prerequisite
to applying to become a lawyer, provided that he or she ob-
tains a host state university decision that the foreign law de-
gree is equivalent to the host state degree. Although the sub-
stantial differences in legal education among the various Com-
munity states might appear to be a matter of legitimate
concern for a host state in such a case, Advocate General
Mayras pointed out that an applicant's proof of the "more spe-
cific and technical knowledge" necessary for practice comes
through the successful passage of the bar examination.7"
The Thieffry judgment has implications that go beyond the
specific facts. The Court notably declared that "freedom of es-
tablishment, subject to observance of professional rules justi-
fied by the general good, is one of the objectives of the
Treaty."' 75 The implication of this declaration is that national
rules limiting the right of establishment of lawyers (or other
professionals) will be allowed only if they are objectively "justi-
fied by the general good." If they are not, the host state has a
duty under Article 5 to abandon the national rule or its limit-
ing effect. It is certainly possible that some national rules re-
72. Id. at 777-78, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at 403-04.
73. Id. at 778, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at 404.
74. Id. at 789, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at 394.
75. Id. at 777, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at 403.
1991-1992] 589
590 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:556
lating to the practice of law, even though of long date, are no
longer objectively justified by the general good in terms of
modern legal practice.
The next significant Court of Justice judgment, Ordre des
Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp , 7 6 a 1984 decision, illus-
trates this point. Mr. Klopp, a German Rechtsanwalt practicing
in Diisseldorf, had obtained a doctorate from the University of
Paris in 1969. He passed the French bar examination in 1980
and sought to open a second law office in Paris, intending to
reside and practice in both Diusseldorf and Paris. Under Paris
bar rules established in accordance with French legislation, an
avocat in Paris may not have an office outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the French court for the Paris region. The issue
presented by the French Supreme Court to the Court ofJustice
was whether this long-standing French rule could prevail over
the right of establishment. The Court held that it could not.
The Court relied on the fact that the right of establish-
ment in Article 52 included specifically the right to open a
branch, which the Court interpreted as also meaning the
branch office of a member of a liberal profession." The Court
concluded that a Member State could not effectively nullify a
right to establish branch offices by requiring a foreign lawyer
to close the office in his or her home state as a precondition for
opening an office in the host state.7" The Court stipulated that
the host state could require the foreign lawyer "to maintain
sufficient contact" with local clients and local judicial authori-
ties, but added that this would be easy, because "modem
methods of transport and telecommunications facilitate" such
contacts.79
The Commission, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom had all argued in favor of a lawyer's right to
set up a branch office in another Member State when properly
qualified locally, and even France admitted that French lawyers
were not prohibited by French rules from having offices in
76. Case 107/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2971, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 99 (noted by Philippa
Watson in 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 736 (1985)); see Jeffrey Mendelsohn, Recent
Development, European Court ofjustice: Paris Bar Rule Violates Right of Establishment, 26
HARv. INT'L L.J. 562 (1985).
77. Klopp, [1984] E.C.R. at 2989-90, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 113.
78. Id. at 2989, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 113-14.
79. Id. at 2990, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 114.
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other states."' It should also be observed that nothing in the
Court's opinion would make a branch office a personal right of
a self-employed lawyer. It seems apparent that a law firm may
also open a branch office in a host state if staffed by lawyers
qualified in the host state. (We will return to this topic in Part
VII.C).
An interesting question is whether Mr. Klopp could open
a third office in France outside the Paris region. The broad
principle of Thieffry, that host state rules restricting establish-
ment must be justified by the "general good," would suggest
that the answer should be yes, because modern transport and
telecommunications would enable Mr. Klopp to carry on the
necessary on-going contacts with clients and the local court at
the site of the third French office, just as he could at the Paris
office. This would amount to reverse discrimination, because
French avocats at the time of the Klopp judgment could not have
offices outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which
they were admitted. However, reverse discrimination was not
regarded by the Court as a sufficient argument to justify limita-
tions on the provider of cross-border services in Commission v.
Germany and Commission v. France, discussed in Part III.81
Doubtless the impact of Klopp influenced France and Germany
to enable law firms to have branch offices in other regions in
their respective recent laws revising the rules governing the
legal profession. 2
The most difficult issue in Klopp was the question whether
he should follow in his Paris practice the German professional
rules and ethics, or the French rules, or both. 'The Court re-
quested the parties and intervenors to supply separate obser-
vations on this issue. The Commission, Denmark, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom suggested that both states'
rules should apply, but did not present views on how conflicts
might be settled.8 3 France stated that French rules must gov-
80. Id. at 2983, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 103.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
82. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
83. Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, Case 107/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 2971, 2977-84. The Commission suggested rather sanguinely that "there is
no reason to suppose" that Mr. Klopp's status as Rechtsanwalt would ever make it
"impossible to comply with the French rules of professional conduct." Id. at 2981.
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ern, even as to French lawyers practicing abroad.84 Advocate
General Sir Gordon Slynn concluded that both states' rules
should be applied, recognizing that "difficulties could arise,"
but maintaining that the risk of such difficulties should not pre-
vent the Court's recognition of a lawyer's right to practice in a
branch office in a host state.85
The Court of Justice stated somewhat tersely that the for-
eign lawyer must "abide by the rules of the [host state] profes-
sion," and that "the existence of a second set of chambers in
another Member State does not prevent the application of the
rules of ethics in the host Member State."86 It could be argued
that this implies that, in case of conflict, the host state rules
should prevail over those of the home state. It is equally likely,
however, that the Court, just as Sir Gordon Slynn in his opin-
ion, did not mean to resolve this issue. If, as the author be-
lieves, the latter view is correct, it is unfortunate that the Court
did not expressly state that this issue was not being decided at
the time.
The adoption of the CCBE's 1988 Code of Conduct, dis-
cussed in Part VI, by all the Member States fortunately will re-
duce the likelihood of conflict, because the Code does achieve
a minimal harmonization of some basic rules and provides a
resolution of conflicts for certain other rules. Nonetheless,
there remains a definite risk that difficult questions will arise
when some host and home state rules are in conflict. We will
return to this topic in Part VIII.
The final important Court judgment in this area is Gullung,
whose rather extraordinary facts were set out in Part III. It
will be recalled that Mr. Gullung, after becoming a German
Rechtsanwalt, opened a branch office in Mulhouse and practiced
under the curious title of jurisconsulte for several years. This
certainly represented an establishment under Article 52. It will
also be recalled that Mr. Gullung had challenged the Colmar
bar council's decision to bar avocats from cooperating with him,
based on his earlier resignation from the status of French
notaire after an ethical proceeding against him.
84. Id. at 2983, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 103.
85. Id. at 2997, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 109.
86. Id. at 2990, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 113-14.
87. Gullung, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57. For the
provision of services aspect of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
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The Colmar Court of Appeal asked the Court of Justice
whether a foreign lawyer had to be a "member of a Bar in the
host country" in order to establish himself or herself there. 8
The Court responded that
[iut should be added that the requirement that lawyers be
registered at a Bar laid down by certain Member States
must be regarded as lawful in relation to Community law
provided, however, that such registration is open to nation-
als of all Member States without discrimination. The re-
quirement seeks to ensure the observance of moral and eth-
ical principles and the disciplinary control of the activity of
lawyers and thus pursues an objective worthy of protec-
tion.89
Implicit in this statement is the view that any limitation on
a foreign lawyer's admission to a local bar must be objectively
justified by the "general good," but that the "general good" in
this case represented the host state's need for observance of
ethical standards by lawyers and disciplinary control of them.
Note, however, that the Court treated the case as involv-
ing only the issue of a foreign lawyer's right to practice in the
same manner as French avocats.90 Advocate General Darmon
suggested that this was the only issue before the Court, be-
cause Mr. Gullung's lawsuit challenged the prohibition of'
assistance by French avocats to Mr. Gullung in any court pro-
ceedings. 9 '
This limitation of the scope of the Court's judgment is of
great importance. Mr. Gullung, the Commission, and the
United Kingdom had raised a different issue, namely, whether
88. Gullung, [1988] E.C.R. at 135, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 71. The Colmar court
also raised the interesting question of whether a foreign established lawyer in a host
state, who is not a member of the host state bar, can rely on the 1977 directive on
freedom to provide services, which was precisely what Mr. Gullung claimed to be able
to do. Id., [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 70-71. The Court ofJustice unfortunately consid-
ered it unnecessary to answer this question. See infra text accompanying notes 130-
37.
89. Id. at 140, 29, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 74.
90. Id. at 139, 27, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 74. Later the Court specifically re-
ferred to Member States' legislation requiring that "any person wishing to establish
himself in their territory as a lawyer within the meaning of their national legislation [to] be
registered at a bar" and stated that host states can apply such legislation to Commu-
nity lawyers who seek establishment rights "in order to benefit from the same status."
Id. at 30, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 75 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 127, 20, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 73.
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a foreign lawyer may establish himself or herself in the host
state and practice under the home state title, such as Recht-
sanwalt or solicitor, presumably engaging in any practice
before courts in the manner set out in the 1977 directive on
lawyers' provision of services. 92 The United Kingdom ex-
pressly argued that the right of establishment protects such
practice under the home state title.9 3
The Court deliberately stated in paragraph 27 that this
was not the issue before it. 4 This is unusual, because the
Court, generally speaking, does not indicate issues which it is
not resolving. Advocate General Darmon argued that allowing
lawyers to establish themselves under their home state title
without admission to the local bar would create "uncertainty
and confusion and, indeed, a disintegration of the rules gov-
erning the profession. 91 5 A U.K. professor, Julian Lonbay,
maintained in a case note on Gullung that the Court of Justice
had "left the clear impression" that lawyers could establish
themselves under their home state title and home state profes-
sional rules in a host state, although he noted Advocate Gen-
eral Darmon's contrary viewpoint.96
It seems prudent to take the Court's paragraph 27 literally
and to conclude that this important issue remains very much
an open one. We will return to it in Part VII.B.
In summary, it is evident that the Court of Justice has sub-
stantially advanced the freedom of establishment for lawyers.
Yet, overall, only a few lawyers (those who can qualify for
membership in the host state's legal profession) can easily rely
on the doctrines embodied in the Court's case law to date in
92. Id. at 120-21.
93. Id. at 121.
94. Id. at 139, $ 27, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 74. Practice as an established lawyer
under the home state title "does not form part of the question referred to the
Court." Id.
95. Id. at 127, $ 21, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 73. The Advocate General argued
later that allowing an establishment right to practice under the home state title Would
create "a very dangerous lack of supervision [because] thorny problems would not
fail to arise once it came to imposing sanctions for even the most elementary
breaches committed in the state of establishment." Id. at 129, 1 29, [1988] 2
C.M.L.R. at 74.
96. Julian Lonbay, Note, 13 EUR. L. REV. 275, 278 (1988). Professor Lonbay
came to this conclusion because of the Court's careful wording of paragraphs 27 and
30 of its judgment, but he modestly observed that his view should "be considered a
suggestion rather than a certainty." Id. at 278 n. 11.
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order to establish themselves in another Community state. It
is time, therefore; to turn to the 1988 directive on the mutual
recognition of higher-education diplomas in order to review its
impact on the legal profession.
V. MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF HIGHER
EDUCATION DIPLOMAS
In Part II we indicated that by the 1980s the process of
harmonization, profession by profession, first of educational
and training standards and then of the requirements for pro-
fessional status was seen to be simply too slow and laborious.
In the June 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal
Market, the Commission instead proposed a general approach
to cover all professions where the rules had not yet been har-
monized.97 This approach, borrowed from the sphere of the
free movement of goods, was to be one of mutual trust and
mutual recognition: each state would trust the quality of
higher education in every other state and recognize the other
state's diplomas as being essentially equivalent to its own.
This was the basis of the draft directive of July 9, 1985,98
one of the earliest proposals in the internal market program,
which, with some significant modifications, was adopted on De-
cember 21, 1988 as the directive on a general system for the
recognition of higher-education diplomas, commonly known
as the Diploma Directive.99 The directive's capital importance
can be seen from the long list of professionals covered, includ-
ing, for example, engineers, surveyors, accountants, insurance
97. White Paper, supra note 5, at 25-26, 93. The approach was initially used in
the 1985 directive for the mutual recognition of architects' diplomas, which harmo-
nized minimally the course coverage and standards for architects' education and
training in the Member States. See Council Directive No. 85/384, supra note 34, Oj.
L 223/15 (1985).
98. Proposal for a Council Directive, COM 85/335 of August 28, 1988, on a
general system for the recognition of higher education diplomas, O.J. C 217/3
(1985), amended by O.J. C 143/7 (1986). Both the original text and the amendment
are appendices to LAGUETrE, supra note 1, at 282-93. For a description of the original
proposal, see John Boyd, Mutual Recognition of Lawyers' Qualifications, 7 Bus. L. REV.
163 (1986); Goebel, supra note 1, at 497-99; Waegenbaur, supra note 23.
99. Diploma Directive, supra note 7, O.J. L 19/16 (1989). The directive is re-
viewed in Saunders, supra note 63, at 206-10; Schloh, supra note 63, at 95-98; Daphne
W. Gardiner, Note, The European Community Directive Mandating Recognition of Post-Grad-
uate Training: Are Borders Openingfor European Professionals?, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
1109, 1127-33 (1990).
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agents, bankers, brokers, physicists, chemists, biologists, for-
esters, and librarians. Naturally, we will only be concerned
with the directive's impact on the legal profession.
The heart of the directive is the obligation placed on
Member States to recognize any diploma or certificate awarded
by a university, or similar higher education institution, in any
other Member State after a course of at least three years dura-
tion (article 1 (a)). Such a diploma must, generally speaking, be
recognized as equivalent to a state's own higher-education di-
plomas when these are required for persons seeking access to a
regulated profession (article 3).
The directive will apply to any Member State "national
wishing to pursue a regulated profession in a host Member
State in a self-employed capacity or as an employed person"
(article 2). The limitation of scope to nationals should be un-
derlined: a Brazilian, Canadian, U.S., or any other non-Com-
munity national cannot benefit from the directive, even if he or
she has obtained a diploma from a university within the Com-
munity. However, the 1992 treaty for a European Economic
Area between the Community and the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) states will require the EFTA states to im-
plement this directive in their own internal legislation, so that
ultimately the mutual recognition of diplomas will apply
throughout the European Economic Area. 10 0
Once a foreign applicant has fulfilled all the conditions for
admission to the host state's regulated profession, he or she
will be fully integrated into that profession, using the host state
professional title (article 7). In effect, this means no "second-
class citizenship" status for the foreign lawyer thus admitted in
the host state. In addition to the applicant's diploma, the host
state must accept documents attesting to such factors as good
character, non-bankruptcy, and the absence of a criminal rec-
ord from the relevant home state authorities when these are
required for access to a profession (article 6). Furthermore,
any applicant who is denied admission to a host state profes-
100. As of early 1992, the text and annexes of the European Economic Area
Agreement were not available, but secondary sources suggest that EFTA states will
be obligated to adopt as internal legislation all relevant Community legislation in the
field of services and establishment. See EC, EFTA Foreign Ministers Reach Accord on New
European Economic Area, BNA 1992 THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF UNIFICATION, Nov. 4,
1991, at 1.
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sion shall have the right of appeal to a host state court or tribu-
nal (article 8(2)).
There are, however, partial exceptions to the general rec-
ognition of diplomas, and in the case of the legal profession,
the exceptions are expected to be the rule.' 0 '
The first exception arises either when the areas of study in
an applicant's home state education and training leading to a
diploma "differ substantially" from those covered in obtaining
the corresponding diploma in the host state, or when the scope
of fields of practice in the host state is broader than the scope
of fields of practice of the corresponding profession in the
home state (article 4(1)(b)). It is expected that education and
training in a common law state will always be seen as substan-
tially different from that in a civil law state. Moreover, even
among civil law states, the legal codes and traditions vary
greatly, so that it is likely that the education and training in
each will usually be seen as substantially different from that in
any other (except, perhaps, in very closely related systems,
such as Belgium and France, or Austria and Germany).
In the event that a substantial difference in education and
training is found, the host state authorities may require the for-
eign applicant either to take an "aptitude test" or to complete
an "adaptation period not exceeding three years" (article
4(1)(b)). The host state has the option between the two alter-
natives. to2
An "aptitude test" is designed to assess the applicant's
"professional knowledge" required for the host state's profes-
sion, but the test is only supposed to assess knowledge of those
subjects that the host state does not consider adequately cov-
ered in obtaining the home state's diploma (article l(g)).10 3
101. "Whereas" clause 9 of the Diploma Directive's preamble states that "irk
particular, the differences between the legal systems of the Member States ... war-
rant special provisions since, as a rule, the education or training ... in the Member
State of origin does not cover the legal knowledge required in the host Member State
with respect to the corresponding legal field." Diploma Directive, supra note 7, OJ.
L 19/16, at 17 (1989).
102. This option granted to host states exists only with regard to the legal pro-
fession; article 4(l)(b) allows the applicant the option to select between the two alter-
natives for all other professions. Id. at 19.
103. Under article 1 (g), each host state is supposed to draw up a "list of subjects
which, on the basis of a comparison of the education and training required in the
Member State and that received by the applicant, are not covered by the [applicant's]
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Quite sensibly, the host state may add to the aptitude test the
"knowledge of the professional rules" of the host state.
The alternative "adaptation period" is defined as a "pe-
riod of supervised practice" under a qualified host state lawyer,
with some form of assessment of the quality of the applicant's
performance during this period (article 1 (f)). Supervised prac-
tice before becoming a lawyer is customary in most Commu-
nity states and may last from one to three years, so that this
approach is not an unusual one (as it would be in the United
States).
Finally, another exception can occur when the home
state's combined period of education and training is at least
one year less than that of the host state (article 4(1)(a)). This
may well happen, because some states require a minimum of
three years for a law degree, while others require four or more,
and because some states do not require probationary super-
vised training at all, whereas others require up to three years of
such training. If the exception does occur, the host state may
require a period of professional experience (but not supple-
mentary education) to compensate for the difference in total
time of education and training. There is a complex formula to
limit the host state's additional required period of professional
experience, with a maximum of four years. There is no need to
summarize this formula, because the directive declares in arti-
cle 4(2) that a host state cannot cumulate a required period of
professional experience with the adaptation period or aptitude
test of article 4(1)(b), and it is expected that for the legal pro-
fession all states will make use of article 4(1)(b).
The directive's success will be determined to some degree
by the leniency or rigor with which a host state decides to com-
pensate for a perceived substantial difference between its edu-
cation and training and that of the home state, or the differ-
ence in scope of fields of practice between the two states. It
now appears that most, if not all, states will opt for an aptitude
test rather than for an adaptation period. The directive was
supposed to have been implemented by legislation in the
diploma." Id. at 18. This suggests that host states should have different aptitude
tests for applicants from different home states, but in fact it appears that the states
that have thus far implemented the directive with regard to the legal profession are
adopting a single aptitude test for applicants from all other Member States.
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Member States by January 4, 1991. By early 1992, nine states
had implemented the directive, but not all have dealt specifi-
cally with the legal profession.' 0 4
The first state to implement the directive was Germany,
which did so on July 6, 1990.105 Germany chose an aptitude
test and has set up stringent standards for it, requiring that it
encompass two written examinations and one oral examination
covering several complex substantive law fields in addition to
the German professional rules.' 0 6 Some states will undoubt-
edly follow Germany's stringent approach, but others are ex-
pected to require examinations that are comparatively less dif-
ficult in character.
After this review of the 1988 directive on recognition of
higher-education diplomas, it is helpful to discuss briefly a re-
cent judgment that states the rules that are applicable pending
the implementation of the directive, and that may also suggest
how the Court would interpret the directive if called upon to
do so.
In Irene Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium ftir Justiz Bundes-und
Europaangelegenheiten Baden Wtirttemberg,10 7 a 1991 case, a Greek
lawyer applied to become a German Rechtsanwalt. She pos-
sessed a doctorate in law from a German university, had
worked for five years in a German law office, and already had
104. The author was informed by the responsible personnel in Commission Di-
rectorate General III, The Internal Market, that Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom notified the Commis-
sion that they have implemented the directive. Apparently all plan to opt for an apti-
tude test, but the nature of that test is not yet established in several of the states.
105. Gesetz iber die Eignungspruifung fir die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft
vom 6. Juli 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I S. 1349 (1990), supplemented by Ver-
ordnung vom 18. Dez. 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I S. 2881 (1990).
106. Each written examination will last five hours. A compulsory topic for one
written examination will cover the contract and property parts of the German civil
code, along with related civil procedure. The second topic is to be chosen by the
applicant from either (1) public and administrative law and procedure, (2) criminal
law and procedure, (3) family law and procedure, (4) corporate and commercial law
and procedure, or (5) labor law and procedure. The oral examination will last one
hour and will cover professional rules as well as substantive law. All examinations, of
course, will be in German.
107. Case C-340/89 (Eur. Ct. J. May 7, 1991) (not yet reported). The French
text is available at the Court of Justice and an English summary is contained in
WEEKLY PROC. OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 10/91, at 8. The case is noted by Professor
Julian Lonbay in Picking Over the Bones. Rights of Establishment Reviewed, 16 EUR. L. REV.
507 (1991).
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the status of a Rechtsberater (legal adviser). The German au-
thorities stated that she must first obtain an initial German law
degree, pass the two usual state exams for lawyers, and finally
fulfill the supervised training period. Her appeals led to a Ger-
man Supreme Court reference in 1989 under Article 177 to
the Court of Justice.
Citing Thieffry, the Court of Justice held that a state is
bound to facilitate a foreign lawyer's right of establishment
under Article 52.108 As a consequence, when a host state ex-
amines the application for admission to its legal profession
made by a person who is already a lawyer in another state, the
host state must compare both the educational qualifications
and the professional experience of the applicant with that usu-
ally required of host state nationals. To the extent that the
applicant's knowledge and experience are comparable, credit
must be given for them; moreover, the applicant must be given
the opportunity to prove that he or she has the knowledge and
qualification that appears to be lacking on the basis of the com-
parison.' 0 9 Finally, the Court observed that a dissatisfied ap-
plicant must have a right of appeal." 1 0
In applying these standards, the German authorities cer-
tainly must give Mrs. Vlassopoulou considerable credit for her
German doctorate and practice experience in Germany, as well
as for her Greek legal education and training. However, the
authorities can presumably still require an appropriately calcu-
lated amount of further German education and/or supervised
training.
Vlassopoulou is of considerable importance because it pro-
vides a standard for foreign applicants for admission to the
legal profession in host states pending the implementation of
the 1988 directive. Moreover, the Commission can use Vlasso-
poulou as a basis for examining the requirements laid down by a
host state in implementing the Diploma Directive to verify
whether they are appropriate or excessively stringent."'
108. Vlassopoulou, slip op. 14.
109. Id. 16-22. Advocate General Van Gerven had strongly urged this pro-
portionality approach to the Court.
110. Id. 22.
111. The examination requirements set for the aptitude test for lawyers in Ger-
many and some other states are certainly stringent; it remains to be seen whether
their effect in practice will prove to be acceptable, or whether there will be a chal-
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We have now completed examination of the 1988 direc-
tive on the recognition of higher education diplomas and re-
lated legal principles, and turn to the useful role played by the
CCBE in furthering Community cross-border practice.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE CCBE
The CCBE is an umbrella organization that groups all of
the Community national bar associations that represent law-
yers engaged in courtroom practice, as well as the law societies
representing U.K. and Irish solicitors." 2 The CCBE does not
include associations of notaries, legal advisors or house coun-
sel.
Founded in 1960, the CCBE has become increasingly ac-
tive since the late 1970s. The role of the CCBE is to provide a
forum for the interchange of views and information among its
member bodies, as well as to represent the legal profession to
the EEC Commission and before the Court of Justice. The
CCBE's Secretariat is in Brussels."' Its member bodies,
grouped in national delegations, with one vote per state, meet
in plenary session semi-annually. The CCBE does not have
any binding delegated authority, legislative or otherwise,
though its recommendations naturally have great influence.
The CCBE has produced one major achievement, the
Code of Conduct, and is actively working on another, the draft
directive on establishment, both to be discussed below. In ad-
dition, the CCBE has working groups engaged in studies of
current issues such as multi-disciplinary partnerships, advertis-
ing, client protection through guarantee funds and insurance,
and developments in the legal profession in Eastern Europe. 114
These may give rise to future proposals or projects. Over the
years, the CCBE undoubtedly has influenced national bar as-
lenge of them under Vlassopoulou either by an unsuccessful applicant or by the Com-
mission in an Article 169 proceeding.
112. The CCBE history and internal structure is described in CCBE CRoss BOR-
DER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, ch. 3. The European Lawyers' Institute in
Copenhagen is producing this compendium with the intention of describing the rules
of the legal profession in each Community state. As of 1991, it described the rules of
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, but the coverage of
France and Germany does not reflect their recent legislative revisions of rules.
113. The CCBE Secretariat address is 40, rue Washington, B-1050, Brussels.
114. Some of the working groups are described in the CCBE CROSs BORDER
PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 3-18 to 3-21.
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sociations to take a broader Community viewpoint toward the
practice of law, combatting the more chauvinistic attitudes that
previously prevailed in some states.
On October 28, 1988, the CCBE annual plenary session
meeting in Strasbourg adopted the Code of Conduct for Law-
yers in the European Community." l5 This Code of Conduct is
analyzed elsewhere by a leading CCBE expert, the English bar-
rister John Toulmin, t 6 but a few observations can appropri-
ately be made here.
First, the Code of Conduct is not a purely advisory docu-
ment. It is intended to be adopted in all Community states by
legislation, regulation, judicial authorization or bar association
rules, as appropriate (Rule 1.3). Indeed, most Community
states have already adopted the Code of Conduct. It thus con-
stitutes a sort of minimum harmonization of professional con-
duct rules. Incidentally, six states that have observer status in
the CCBE (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Sweden
and Switzerland) are likewise in the process of adopting the
Code of Conduct and it is quite possible that other European
states will do so as well.
Second, its scope covers all cross-border practice (Rule
1.4), which would certainly appear to include not only the per-
formance of temporary services in the context of Article 59,
but also the activities of a lawyer established in a host state who
is not, for whatever reason, admitted to practice by a host state
bar association. Thus, the Code of Conduct should govern the
conduct of a U.K. barrister or solicitor, or a German Recht-
sanwalt or a French avocat established in practice in another
state under his or her respective home state title.
Third,' to the extent that the Code of Conduct's specific
rules do not cover a particular issue, a lawyer engaged in cross-
border practice is "bound to observe the rules of the Bar or
Law Society to which he belongs" (Rule 1.3.2), which ensures,
as a final safeguard, that a lawyer is subject to home state pro-
fessional rules and discipline. Of course, this does not alter
the legal obligation to observe host state rules in the circum-
115. The Code text is an appendix to Toulmin, supra note 46. The CCBE Work-
ing Group on Deontology issued an Explanatory Memorandum in May 1989, which is
available at the CCBE Secretariat.
116. Toulmin, supra note 46.
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stances described by the 1977 directive on lawyers' services
discussed in Parts III and VII.A.
Fourth, the application of the specific rules of the Code of
Conduct in cross-border practice will modify the present rules
in many states, usually in the direction of greater care in the
protection of client's interests, such as, for example, Rule 3.2
on conflicts of interest, Rule 3.8 on client funds, and Rule 3.9
on professional indemnity insurance. In some instances, this
may influence national bar associations to introduce similar
rules for domestic national practice, if they do not already ex-
ist. For example, several Community states do not have rules
governing the segregation of client's funds or requiring mal-
practice insurance.
Finally, the Code of Conduct's harmonization of some
rules and choice of law approach to other rules is cast in the
form of relatively short and simple principles. This means that
the Code is relatively easy to understand, which has obvious
merit, but it also means that the Code is only a starting point,
because many issues of potential conflict between home and
host rules are not resolved or only partially resolved. None-
theless, the Code of Conduct is quite valuable in promoting
the resolution of some significant differences among national
rules of professional conduct. We will return to certain spe-
cific provisions of the Code of Conduct when considering the
issue of applicable professional rules in Part VIII.
The second major initiative of the CCBE is the draft direc-
tive on the right of establishment for lawyers."l 7 This is a pro-
ject which has been under way for over a decade, commencing
with the 1982 Athens draft 5/82 bis." 8 The current working
draft, an April 1990 version, was produced by four CCBE offi-
cials designated as experts ("wise men") for this purpose:
Michel Gout, John Toulmin, Heinz Weil and Niels Fisch-
Thomsen. This is the subject of analysis in a separate com-
117. The text of the April 1990 Draft Directive on Right of Establishment for
Lawyers [hereinafter CCBE Draft Directive] is set out in an appendix to Heinz Weil,
The Proposal for a Directive on the Right of Establishment for Lawyers in the European Commu-
nity, 15 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 699 app. (1991-1992).
118. See Draft Directive-Right of Establishment-Lawyers-Athenai (May
1982) (available at CCBE Secretariat) [hereinafter Athens Draft]. For an analysis of
the Athens Draft, see SPEDDING, supra note 1, at 156-68, and Goebel, supra note 1, at
499-503.
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mentary by Heinz Weil,' 19 but again some observations are
useful.
The CCBE recognizes that the 1988 directive on the rec-
ognition of diplomas provides only some assistance in devel-
oping the right of establishment for lawyers, because it is lim-
ited in nature to facilitating the ability of law students and law-
yers (usually young lawyers) to become members of a host
state bar. Many lawyers have no desire to do that. Moreover,
there is no present coverage of the establishment rights of law
firms.
Hence, the CCBE is attempting to produce a draft direc-
tive which, if approved by ten of its twelve Member State dele-
gations, can be proposed to the Commission as the basis for a
possible directive. The responsible officials at the Commission
have followed the evolution of the draft with interest and may
be expected to review it carefully for possible adoption, pro-
vided it is first endorsed in a quasi-unanimous fashion by
Member State national associations. However, it is important
to emphasize that the Commission, if it picks up the endeavor,
will produce its own draft, doubtlessly inspired by the CCBE
proposal, but consonant with the Commission's views as to
what is legally required by the case law of the Court and as to
what represents the soundest policy for the European Commu-
nity.
The CCBE draft directive expresses two major policy atti-
tudes. The first is the enunciation of the right of lawyers (de-
fining "lawyers" as the same classes of legal professionals set
out, state by state, in the 1977 directive on lawyers' services) to
establish themselves in practice in host states under their home
state title, without becoming members of the host state bar (ar-
ticles 4 and 7).
Now, this certainly represents a shift in the traditional
view of some national associations which have felt that they
ought to enjoy a monopoly or quasi-monopoly on legal serv-
ices, and that all foreign Community lawyers ought to be able
to exercise a right of establishment only by full integration into
the host state legal profession. To promote acceptance of its
policy approach, the CCBE draft directive makes two conces-
sions to the host state legal professions. First, the foreign law-
119. Weil, supra note 1 17.
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yers may be excluded by host states from three specified types
of practice: administration of decedents' estates, transfers of
real estate title interests, and litigation in court or administra-
tive proceedings (except to the extent occasional services are
provided under the terms of the 1977 directive on lawyers'
services) (article 6).
The second concession to the host state legal professions
is that the foreign lawyer must be registered in the host state
and subject to the host state professional rules, except as mod-
ified by the CCBE Code of Conduct, and except to the extent
that the host state rules are not "objectively justified by the
public interest" (article 8). The latter exception is a highly de-
sirable reference to the Court of Justice's doctrine as devel-
oped in Thieffry, van Binsbergen and Klopp.
Not only are the host state rules binding on the foreign
registered lawyer, but the host state authorities shall carry out
any disciplinary proceedings and impose sanctions as neces-
sary (article 10). The home state authorities are provided with
minority representation on the disciplinary panel (three repre-
sentatives from the host state, two from the home state).1 20
There is no formal co-decision requirement. Although article
10 states that the "mixed" panel is to endeavor to reach a
unanimous decision, it also states that the panel acts by major-
ity vote. A final noteworthy point is that the "mixed" panel is
intended to have the status of a "court or tribunal" under Arti-
cle 177 of the EEC Treaty, which would give it the power to
refer to the Court of Justice difficult issues of Community law
arising during its proceedings (article 9(6)).
The second important policy aspect of the draft directive
is that it provides express rights to law firms. Law firms may
establish themselves in host states either directly through
branch offices or in association with host state lawyers (article
11). The term "association" presumably covers partnerships,
joint ventures or formal mergers of firms.
Because the draft directive would create a much broader
right of establishment for lawyers than presently exists, and
120. Article 9 of the draft directive, which deals with disciplinary proceedings of
foreign lawyers established as members of the host state legal profession, makes the
disciplinary panel one composed only of host state lawyers, but allows the home state
profession to have representatives to express its views.
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because it represents a careful balancing of interests between
home and host state, it is to be hoped that it will be adopted in
its present or a slightly modified form. However, as of late
1991, the CCBE, acting in plenary session, has only been able
to muster a majority of eight Member State delegations in
favor of the draft, not the ten required by CCBE internal pro-
cedures.' 2 ' We will further consider the, draft directive when
relevant to unresolved issues in Part VII.B and C.
We now turn to an evaluation of the state of progress rep-
resented by Community law as above described, and to a con-
sideration of some important unresolved issues.
VII. THE STATE OF PROGRESS TOWARD COMMUNITY-
WIDE RIGHTS OF PRACTICE
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the Community
legislation, Court of Justice case law, and CCBE initiatives in
order to try to ascertain the level of progress toward attaining
a lawyer's freedom to provide services and right of establish-
ment on a Community-wide basis, as well as to identify issues
that still need to be resolved. The following topics will be con-
sidered: (a) freedom to provide services; (b) establishment
rights for individual lawyers; and (c) establishment rights for
law firms.
A. Freedom to Provide Services
It is clear that great progress has been made through the
combined effect of favorable Court judgments and the 1977
directive on lawyers' freedom to provide services. In large
measure, there is no serious obstacle to cross-border legal
services. Nonetheless, some issues remain.
First, the 1977 directive's scope is limited to the categories
of lawyers identified in article 1(2), i.e., the national legal pro-
fessions which provide courtroom services, plus U.K. and Irish
solicitors. Although van Binsbergen recognizes the right of legal
representatives to provide services under Article 59,122 the di-
rective does not cover legal advisors or counsellors, even when
organized in national professional associations with their own
121. Weil, supra note 117, at 709.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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rules of conduct. The directive likewise does not cover nota-
ries. This is an unfortunate gap in coverage. Just as the 1988
directive on mutual recognition of diplomas covers all legal
professions, the 1977 directive ought to be amended to cover,
in some appropriate fashion, cross-border services provided by
all legal professions.12 3
Second, the interplay between host and home state rules
in article 4 of the 1977 directive is not very satisfactory, both
because article 4 is not very clearly expressed, and because the
formula that one set of rules governs "without prejudice to"
the other does not finally determine which rules deserve prior-
ity in case of irreconcilable conflict. The CCBE Code of Con-
duct reduces the number of potential conflicts between home
and host state rules, but does not eliminate them.
The Court of Justice has consistently stated that profes-
sional rules are a factor that may limit cross-border services to
the extent that they are objectively justified by the "general
good."' 24 This formula definitely should be applied in any res-
olution of conflict between home and host state rules. How-
ever, the specific application in a given case requires careful
analysis and earnest reflection. It is quite likely that some
states' professional responsibility rules are no longer essential
to protect modern clients' interests or to achieve valid goals in
the modern administration of justice, and are accordingly no
longer justified by the "general good." We will return to this
subject in Part VIII when considering applicable rules of con-
duct.
Third, the line of demarcation between providing a service
and establishment is not clearly drawn, although it is generally
assumed that such a line exists.' 25 The point is significant, be-
123. This proposal is perhaps too idealistic. The Commission and the Council
of Ministers have limited time and resources to devote to amendments of prior legis-
lation. Amendments to this directive may not seem to warrant a high priority. More-
over, notaries are notoriously jealous of their prerogatives. National associations of
notaries may oppose any effort to enable cross-border services in that profession.
124. Gullung, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57; van Bin-
sbergen, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 298. The same princi-
ple applies in commercial and financial services. See German Insurance, Case 205/
84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69; Criminal Proceedings Against Alfred
John Webb, Case 279/80, [1981] E.C.R. 3305, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
125. In Gullung, the Commission, France, and Spain all contended that there
exists a distinction between providing a service and establishment: establishment im-
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cause the right to provide legal services in a host state under a
home state title is certain, whereas the right to establishment
under a home state title, without integration in the host state
bar, is in dispute.
Article 60 permits the provider of legal services to do so
"temporarily" in the host state. In view of the Court of Jus-
tice's expansive interpretation of service rights, "temporarily"
should not connote any brief time period, but rather should
enable a stay commensurate with the scale of the service.' 26 In
commercial services, the Court of Justice recently held in Rush
Portuguesa Lda. v. Office National d'Immigration that a foreign con-
tractor may spend a period of time in a host state to work on a
large project (in that case, a railroad), and may bring to the
host state all the appropriate manpower resources needed "for
the duration of the works in question. 127 By analogy, a lawyer
or law firm should be able to spend substantial time, even
months, in a host state during the course of a contested take-
over bid, or a protracted criminal, civil or arbitration proceed-
ing, or a complex joint venture or syndicated loan negotiation.
plies that "the activities will be pursued permanently," while providing services in-
volves "occasional or temporary activities." Gullung, [1988] E.C.R. at 121. However,
WYAt-r & DASHWOOD, supra note 16, observe that "the provision of services from one
State to another on a regular basis, accompanied by temporary residence in the host
State, may shade imperceptibly into establishment." Id. at 198; see KAvrEVN &
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 16, at 429 (contending that difference between
providing services and establishment is "economically arbitrary and moreover fluid
in practice").
126. Cf. Commission v. Italy, Case 63/86, [1988] E.C.R. 29, 53, [1989] 2
C.M.L.R. 601, 619 (holding that person providing services may do so "for such an
extended period that he needs to have housing there," and accordingly that Italy
must grant such person low-interest housing loans available to its nationals); LASOK,
supra note 18, at 7 (stating that "[tihe freedom to provide services entails the right to
enter the territory of the recipient and to stay there till the operation has been com-
pleted, for example a plumber established in France installing sanitary facilities in a
house situated in Belgium").
127. Case C-113/89, [19901 E.C.R. 1439, 1445, 19, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 818,
843 (noted by Lawrence Gormley in Workers and Services Distinguished, 17 EUR. L. REV.
63 (1992)), held that a Portuguese contractor had a right to take a large work force
(68 workers) to France to provide services in construction on the high speed TGV
railroad system. Although the Court made no reference to the length of time needed
for the project, construction on a railroad may take months or even years. Since both
WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 16, and KAPTEYN & VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, supra
note 16, cited contractors' work on major projects as demonstrating the shading be-
tween the provision of services and establishments, the result in Rush Portuguesa may
prove them wrong: a long-term large scale provision of a service appears to continue
to fall under Article 59, and not to become establishment under Article 52.
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Likewise, the foreign lawyer or law firm should have the ability
to make use of a local office base during: this time, adequately
staffed for the affair in process.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that a foreign law-
yer or law firm cannot come "temporarily" to a host state on a
repeated or regular basis to provide services without being
deemed to be established in the host state. For example, a
Dutch Community law specialist should be able to travel regu-
larly to Brussels or Luxembourg to deal with Community offi-
cials or advise clients; a German arbitration practitioner should
be able to repeatedly visit Paris to handle ICC arbitrations; and
a French patent law expert should be able to travel regularly to
Munich for European patent affairs.' 2 8
Arguably, only the conduct of legal activities in a host
state for an indefinite period of time should be considered es-
tablishment rather than the provision of services. 29 Presuma-
bly, whenever a lawyer or law firm opens an office in a host
state for the representation of a number of clients in a variety
of matters for an indefinite term, this should be considered es-
tablishment rather than an extensive provision of services.
The fourth and final issue relating to Article 59 and the
1977 directive is whether a lawyer established under the home
title in a host state may occasionally provide services in civil or
criminal litigation or administrative proceedings. (We will as-
sume for the moment that a Community lawyer does have the
right of establishment under the home title, as opposed to be-
ing obliged to become a member of the host state legal profes-
sion in order to enjoy establishment rights-which view is cor-
rect is an issue discussed in section B below.)
This was the final question referred by the Colmar Court
128. Cf. M. Sager v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., Case C-76/90 (Eur. Ct. J. July 25,
1991) (not yet reported) (summarized in WEEKLY PROC. OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 15/
91, at 26). The Court held that the monopoly granted to authorized German legal
professionals by a 1935 law could not be used to prevent a U.K. patent service com-
pany from handling maintenance and renewal of patents. The Court held that the
U.K. company's right to perform services was improperly limited by the German law
whose sweeping character violated the principle of proportionality. The judgment by
implication would permit foreign patent attorneys to provide patent services in Ger-
many on a regular basis.
129. This is the approach taken to distinguish establishment by LASOK, supra
note 18, at 7. He cites as examples of establishment a British architect setting up
practice in Paris and a British firm of solicitors opening an office in Brussels.
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of Appeal in Gullung, Which the Court of Justice declined to
answer on the ground that Mr. Gullung lacked the "capacity"
to satisfy French professional rules required for participation
in a court proceeding.3 0 The Commission hedged a bit on
this issue, pointing out that Mr. Gullung's practice at his Mul-
house office was not conducted as a Rechtsanwalt, but rather as
a jurisconsulte, or legal advisor. (Mr. Gullung's legal position
undoubtedly would have been stronger had he tried to estab-
lish himself under his proper home title, Rechtsanwalt.) The
Commission then appeared to say that Mr. Gullung could have
acted "in the capacity of a provider of services" with the rights
accorded by the Treaty and the 1977 directive' 3 ' (perhaps with
the idea that he could have acted in France as a Rechtsanwalt
providing services from his office in Offenburg, Germany).
Advocate General Darmon contended that to mix the rights
relating to the provision of services with those of establishment
represented "total confusion," 132 but his view is merely the
logical consequence of his opinion that lawyers have no right
of establishment except as members of the host state profes-
sion. i33
Article 6(2) of the CCBE draft directive on establishment
would allow registered lawyers established in the host state
under the home state title the power to participate in "legal
proceedings" (i.e., civil and criminal litigation).in the manner
permitted for lawyers performing "occasional services" under
the terms of the 1977 directive, "in conjunction with" a quali-
fied host state courtroom lawyer.' 3 4 This represents a sound
policy approach in the context of the draft directive's attempt
to balance home and host state interests: it prevents estab-
lished lawyers under the home state title from customarily or
routinely engaging in litigation, while allowing them some par-
ticipation in litigation on an "occasional" basis.
Apart from sound policy, there is good reason to argue
that this is the correct legal interpretation of the interplay be-
130. Gullung, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, 140, 32, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57,
75. There is no basis in the Court's judgment for implying an answer to this question
one way or another.
131. d. at 121.
132. Id. at 130, 30, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 75.
133. See supra text accompanying note 95.
134. CCBE Draft Directive, supra note i 17, art. 6(2).
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tween Articles 52 and 59. It is probable that a host state can
prevail in an argument that restriction of courtroom practice to
qualified host state lawyers represents a "general good" inter-
est that can limit the rights of foreign established lawyers. 13 5
However, when foreign Community lawyers have the right to
come into a host state occasionally to participate in litigation
"in conjunction with" a qualified host state lawyer under the
terms of the 1977 directive, it is difficult to believe that a host
state has an objectively justified "general good" argument
against similar occasional participation in litigation by an es-
tablished Community lawyer under the home state title. After
all, the established lawyer is certainly obliged to follow the host
state professional rules in any such litigation, pursuant to arti-
cle 4 of the directive.
This seems the appropriate way to apply the Treaty princi-
ple that the basic right of providing services is to be furthered,
especially within the context of achieving an integrated inter-
nal market. If a foreign Community lawyer can claim greater
rights under Article 59 than he or she can under Article 52,
then it seems consonant with Treaty interpretation principles
to cumulate the rights, rather than to treat Articles 52 and 59
as mutually exclusive.' 36 Advocate General Darmon's view in
Gullung that simultaneous application of both Treaty articles
would represent "confusion"' 137 holds water only if one agrees
with him that a foreign Community lawyer, in order to be es-
tablished, must first become a member of the host state profes-
sion qualified for courtroom practice, in which case, of course,
it is superfluous to speak of rights to provide litigation services
under Article 59.
Having thus concluded an appraisal of open issues with
regard to the provision of legal services, we now turn to the
topic of establishment.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
136. See WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 16, at 199. The authors make a similar
point in discussing possible gaps between the scope of Articles 52 and 59. They
contend that one should "consider Articles 52 and 59 as a whole, and in the light of
the object and purpose of the Treaty .... Articles 52 and 59 are intended to safe-
guard the rights of self-employed persons to pursue occupational activities through-
out the Community regardless of the location of their place of business .... Id.
137. Gullung, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, 140, 30, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57,
1991-19921 611
612 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:556
B. Establishment Rights for Individual Lawyers
Although the Court of Justice case law from Reyners to
Vlassopoulou has significantly facilitated the right of establish-
ment for lawyers, it is the 1988 directive on recognition of
higher-education diplomas that represents the most important
Community law achievement to date.
The greatest impact of the 1988 Diploma Directive will be
on law students and young lawyers. It is indisputable that re-
cent years have marked a substantial increase in the mobility of
young people within the Community. Greater opportunities
for study in other countries, enhanced language capabilities,
and social and marital ties with persons of other nationalities
have all contributed to efforts by young people to reside and
work in other states. Young lawyers are no exception. More-
over, young lawyers are often attracted to foreign commercial
and financial centers as sites for attractive and potentially re-
munerative practice.
Large numbers of law students and young lawyers may be
expected to make use of the directive's new approach. Of
course, much will depend on how rigorous or lenient a host
state is in applying the exceptions to automatic recognition of
higher education diplomas set out in article 4 of the direc-
tive.' 38 It may be expected, however, that the Commission will
carefully monitor both the system established by Member
States to apply article 4, as well as the functioning of the sys-
tem in practice. The Court of Justice's standards in Vlasso-
poulou may be expected to inspire the Commission to take ac-
tion under EEC Treaty Article 169 against any state that raises
too high a hurdle to foreign students or lawyers.139
It appears that all, or virtually all, Member States will exer-
cise their option under article 4 to use an aptitude test, rather
than an adaptation period, to deal with applicants whose home
state legal education and training differs significantly from that
in the host state. This seems a desirable choice. By its nature,
an aptitude test is more objective and'tailored to cover the
most critical differences in education between the host and
other states. In contrast, the use of an adaptation period runs
several risks: many otherwise highly skilled practicing attor-
138. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
139. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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neys are not talented in training young lawyers; any appraisal
of the trainee's progress is apt to be much more subjective;
and adaptation periods can become a form of economic ex-
ploitation of the young lawyer.
It is true that aptitude tests, particularly if they cover a
substantial number of host state legal fields or if they are rigor-
ously applied, may, in effect, require the applicant to under-
take studies for several months or even a year in the host state.
This is not necessarily unjustified, even if the directive's guid-
ing principle is trust in the home state diploma for higher edu-
cation. Legal education in the Community is highly diverse in
character. It is reasonable for a host state to require an assur-
ance that an applicant possess a basic knowledge of its legal
system and the capacity to do legal research as practice needs
may require. It is perhaps pertinent to note that the New York
Court of Appeals changed its rules in 1990 to require all appli-
cants for the bar examination to have successfully passed
twenty-four credit hours of courses in a U.S. law school, as
compared to its prior requirement that applicants with foreign
law degrees only provide proof that their degree was recog-
nized as sufficient for admission to a U.S. graduate law pro-
gram. 1 40
Moreover, there are an increasing number of Community
law faculties that provide joint-degree programs, LL.M. stud-
ies, or other programs designed for foreign law students.14 1
The Community's Erasmus program for inter-university coop-
eration in teaching and research and for financial aid to stu-
dents studying in other states is one of the noteworthy Com-
munity successes of recent years.1 42 Law students can take ad-
140. N.Y. CT. APP. R. pt. 520, 520.5(b). See Goebel, supra note 1, at 474-75,
517-18, for a description of the Court of Appeals rule prior to 1990 and the motive
for the change to require 24 credit hours of study in an accredited law school.
141. Well-known LL.M. programs specializing in European and Community law
are to be found at the College of Europe in Bruges, the European University in Flo-
rence, and the universities of Amsterdam, Brussels (both Flemish and French law
faculties), Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Exeter, Leyden, London, Louvain, Nancy, Paris,
and Saarbruicken, to name only a few. See generally L. Friedman & G. Teubner, Legal
Education and Legal Integration: European Hopes and American Experience, in INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1/3, at 345 (M. Cappelletti et
al. eds., 1985). See also Nicholas J. Skarlatos, European Lawyer's Right to Transnational
Legal Practice in the European Community, 1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 49, 65
(1991).
142. The Erasmus program in the 1990-91 academic year furthered inter-uni-
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vantage of Erasmus grants to study the basic features of other
legal systems in law faculties in other states. Contributing to
cross-border university education is the recent Council direc-
tive granting a right of residence for students, together with a
right of non-discriminatory access to vocational and profes-
sional training. 43 Also relevant is the inclusion of education
as a formal area of Community activity for the first time in a
new Treaty Article 126, to be added by the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union of February 7, 1992. Article 126 calls for in-
creased mobility of teachers and students, cooperation be-
tween educational establishments, and enhanced language
training,144 and may be expected to prompt further Commu-
nity initiatives.
As valuable as the 1988 Diploma Directive is apt to be-
come for recently graduated law students and young lawyers, it
may not prove as useful to older lawyers. Experience shows
that with increasing age and years of separation from an initial
legal education, it becomes quite difficult to pass a formal ex-
amination of legal knowledge. Moreover, if a period of studies
in the host state becomes pragmatically a necessity in order to
pass the aptitude test, the older lawyer is more apt to have fa-
milial or other economic obligations that make it more difficult
to cease or reduce remunerated practice during the period of
studies.
Also important is the fact that many foreign lawyers, and
especially foreign law firms, have no desire to become inte-
grated in a host state bar. They usually have no interest in the
host state courtroom or administrative practice which is often a
monopoly of the host state legal profession. Instead, the for-
versity cooperation among 1200 faculties and provided financial assistance for cross-
border higher education studies for 59,000 students. It is now being expanded to
include EFTA states. See EC Commission, 25th General Report on the Activities of
the EC-1991, at 475-76 (1992).
143. Council Directive No. 90/366 ofJune 28, 1990 on the ight of residence for
students, O.J. L 180/30 (1990). The directive was intended to supplement the Court
ofJustice recognition of these rights in the vocational training context of Treaty Arti-
cle 128 in Vincent Blaizol v. University of Liege, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379,
[1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 57. In this case, the Court held that Community students had a
right of access to all university studies without discrimination on the basis of nation-
ality.
144. The Treaty on European Union is intended to enter into force on January
1, 1993 or as soon thereafter as all Member States ratify it. The text is available in
book form from the Office of Official Publications of the EC.
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eign lawyer or law firm customarily seeks to carry on interna-
tional commercial practice (including, for example, finance, tax
planning, corporate and securities law, franchising, licensing,
distribution and commercial agency, joint ventures, competi-
tion law and general Community law). The foreign lawyer or
law firm often believes that it is more appropriate to carry on
such practice under the home state legal title, which informs
clients properly and avoids confusion with host state lawyers.
There is therefore a definite need for Community legisla-
tion to supplement the 1988 Diploma Directive by recognizing
a mode of establishment under the home state title. The
CCBE's draft directive on establishment is the obvious candi-
date for the basis of such legislation.
At the outset of this Article, reference was made to the
need for an integrated Community legal profession within the
context of the integrated internal market. In the vitally impor-
tant financial services industry, after long deliberation and
analysis of policy, the Community has chosen to move to mar-
ket integration through use of the "single license." Thus, pur-
suant to the Second Banking Directive, a bank may establish
branches and operate throughout the Community on the basis
of its home state license and under the prudential supervision
of home state authorities. 45
Why should legal services be treated in a different fashion
from banking services? Is it because clients should be per-
ceived as requiring greater consumer protection in the host
state than are bank depositors or the users of financial serv-
ices? That seems hardly plausible, especially in view of the fact
that the large law firms that are most apt to provide cross-bor-
der services through branch offices typically have sophisticated
commercial and financial clients who are quite capable of pro-
tecting their interests in dealing with their lawyers. Such so-
phisticated clients are precisely the type most apt to pursue
ethics complaints or malpractice actions.
It is perhaps true that host states have an objectively justi-
fied "general good" concern in preventing established lawyers
under the home state title from engaging in certain types of
legal activities or counselling when the risk of error could cre-
ate particular hardship for the client. A host state may reason-
145. Second Banking Directive, supra note 62, O.J. L 386/1 (1989).
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ably consider that even sophisticated foreign lawyers could
make disastrous mistakes in certain fields of practice where
legal regimes differ radically and are apt to be highly technical.
The CCBE draft directive responds to this host state concern
by granting in article 6(1) the option to bar foreign lawyers
established under the home state title from "the preparation of
formal documents" in the administration of decedents' estates
or in the transfer of title interests in real estate, as well as from
general courtroom practice, subject to the right of occasional
participation in litigation under the 1977 directive.' 46 The ar-
ticle 6(1) exceptions are narrowly tailored and would not ap-
pear to prevent lawyers established under the home state title
from engaging in international trust and estate planning, espe-
cially when a client has assets in several countries, or in dealing
with the investment, financing and tax planning involved in in-
ternational real estate transactions, while leaving the actual es-
tate administration or real property conveyances and title
transfers to host state lawyers (who are often notaries).
Indeed, it might be that the CCBE draft should also in-
clude family law as an area that the host state could reserve to
host state lawyers. Family law encompasses sensitive social is-
sues, such as the validity of marriages, separations and di-
vorces, marriage settlements and agreements, adoptions and
custody. It is interesting to note that the New York Court of
Appeals rules on legal consultants prohibit them from legal ac-
tivities involving family law. 14 7
Do host states have a legitimate interest in insuring that all
established Community lawyers follow their professional
rules? This is a debatable premise (see Part VIII on applicable
rules of conduct), but even if one accepts it, the CCBE draft
directive takes the approach of requiring foreign lawyers estab-
lished under their home state title to subject themselves to
host state professional rules and disciplinary proceedings. 148
Undoubtedly, one of the unarticulated motives for trying
to prevent foreign lawyers from establishment under the home
state title is a fear of competition, especially from large foreign
firms. Increased competition would certainly result in many
146. CCBE Draft Directive, supra note 117.
147. N.Y. CT. App. R. pt. 520.
148. CCBE Draft Directive, supra note 117, arts. 8-10.
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commercial centers if foreign firms had easy access to them,
but in a free market competition is considered to be beneficial
unless the competition is somehow unfairly conducted. The
experience of the legal profession in many European commer-
cial centers, notably Brussels, London, and Paris, would seem
to demonstrate that the presence of large foreign firms has not
stifled local competition, but rather stimulated the growth of
large local firms capable not only of vigorous and competent
competition on their own turf, but of branching out themselves
to foreign centers. 149 Sophisticated local firms have learned to
compete by recruiting young lawyers educated and trained in
foreign systems and international business transactions (often
holding LL.M. degrees from leading U.S. or European law fac-
ulties), by merging to augment the scope of services, by adopt-
ing modern telecommunication and information facilities, and
by developing cross-border associations or correspondent net-
works.
Accordingly, the CCBE draft directive on establishment
merits serious examination. Indeed, even if the CCBE is un-
able to muster the necessary Member State delegation quasi-
unanimity to approve the draft, there is no reason why the
Commission should not act on its own initiative. After all, as
suggested at the outset, greater market integration for the
legal profession is a highly desirable factor in furthering the
internal market goal. Commission resources are not unlim-
ited, but they would be well spent on the endeavor to develop
an appropriate draft for lawyers' establishment rights.
The final issue to be discussed in this section is whether
foreign lawyers already enjoy a right of establishment under
the home state title, even absent Community legislation.
The argument for the view that Community lawyers have a
right to establish themselves in host states under their home
state title, made formally by the United Kingdom in Gullung,150
is based on an expansive reading of Court of Justice judg-
ments, notably Reyners, Thieffry and Klopp. It will be recalled
that Professor Julian Lonbay suggested in his note on Gullung
that the Court of Justice had implicitly approved such a right
149. The news articles in the International Financial Law Review on legal develop-
ments in such centers, supra notes 8-9 and 12, demonstrate the point.
150. Gullung, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57.
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when it stated that the issue of such practice under home state
title was not before the Court.'' On the other hand, the
strongest expression of the view that Community law does not
permit a lawyer's establishment in other states under the home
state title was made by Advocate General Darmon in Gul-
lung. 152
The issue may well yet come to the Court of Justice, be-
cause the 1990 French legislation merging the avocat and conseil
juridique professions includes an article that forbids the render-
ing of legal advice by unqualified persons. 53 Several U.K. so-
licitor firms, practicing in Paris through branch offices for
years, have never qualified as conseil juridique firms, and have
relied on claimed rights of establishment under the home ti-
tle.'5 4 If the French authorities challenge the U.K. solicitor
firms' continued practice of law in France, or if the firms raise
the issue on their own initiative, presumably the issue will be
referred to the Court of Justice. 55
The French position is weakened to some extent by Article
53, the "stand-still" article, which prohibits "any new restric-
tions on the right of establishment" after the EEC Treaty be-
came effective in 1958. In as much as France had not granted a
monopoly on legal activity to avocats before 1958, had not con-
sidered such a monopoly to be necessary to protect consumer
or other interests from '1958 to 1990, and the French authori-
ties had tolerated the establishment and active practice in
France by Community lawyers under their home title for many
years, whether France can now introduce a legal monopoly
that cuts back on prior establishment rights is subject to seri-
151. See supra note 96.
152. Gullung, [1988] E.C.R. at 127-30, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 65-69.
153. Article 54 of the Law of Dec. 31, 1990, supra note 11.
154. See Josephine Carr, Contrary to the Spirit of 1992?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug.
1988, at 10 (noting that two of largest U.K. solicitor firms were not registered as
conseiljuridique firms in France, and indicating Law Society's criticism of then draft
French rules). After France adopted its law, the U.K. Lord Chancellor MacKay noted
the unsuccessful attempt of the U.K. government to change the law's text, saying that
the French law was "creating more restrictive conditions: rather the reverse of the
spirit of 1992." French Lawyers Law Denounced, INr'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1991, at 2.
155. It is possible, though unlikely, that the Commission itself could challenge
the 1990 French law's barrier to foreign Community lawyers' establishment rights.
The Commission is more apt to let the U.K. solicitor firms raise the issue, if they
choose to do so. As of the end of 1991, it appears that all interested parties are
waiting to see if the CCBE adopts its draft directive on establishment.
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ous question under Article 53.156
Apart from that point, however, whether lawyers can claim
a right of establishment under their home state title is by no
means certain. It is true that Thieffry, Klopp, and Vlassopoulou
hold that Member States, under Article 5 of the Treaty, have a
duty not to frustrate an otherwise proper exercise of a right of
establishment. It can be argued that a state has a duty, under
Article 5, not to prevent Community lawyers from establishing
themselves under their home state title unless the state can
prove that this constitutes a serious risk to clients or the ad-
ministration of justice.
On the other hand, the Court has consistently recognized
a host state's power to limit establishment rights when the limit
is objectively justified for the "general good." Moreover, the
Court of Justice in Gullung stated that "in the absence of spe-
cific Community rules in the matter each Member State is, in
principle, free to regulate the exercise of the legal profession
in its territory."' 5 7 However, that quotation has to be seen in
its context, which essentially limits it to courtroom practice.
The Court also specifically stated that the issue as to whether
Community lawyers could establish themselves under their
home state title was not before it.
Perhaps the correct approach in resolving this issue would
be for the Court to allow the foreign lawyer to practice only in
certain fields under the home title, leaving the host state to
forbid activities in certain other specified fields on the ground
of objectively justified protection of a "general good" interest,
which is essentially the approach taken by the CCBE draft di-
rective. This would seem to abide by the principle of propor-
tionality, which the Court has always said limits states when
they create exceptions to the "four freedoms" of the Treaty. 5 8
156. France may argue that a non-discriminatory regulation does not violate Ar-
ticle 53, but it is unclear whether the case law justifies this view. See LASOK, supra note
18, at 27-28.
157. Gullung, Case 292/86, [1988] E.C.R. 111, 139, 28, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 57,
74.
158. The principle of proportionality, derived originally from German adminis-
trative law, is one of the most fundamental features of Community law. The Court of
Justice has used the principle to strike down excessive features of Community legisla-
tion. See, for example, S.A. Buitoni v. Fonds d'Orientation et de R6gularisation des
March6s Agricoles, Case 122/78, [1979] E.C.R. 677, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 665. The
Court has also used it to strike down excessive application of the protection of Mem-
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The host state would have to justify the excepted fields of ac-
tivity on the basis of the protection of clients (consumer pro-
tection) or the furtherance of the administration of justice,
subject to the Court's review. 159
In any event, it would seem evident that a Community law-
yer or law firm must be allowed to establish an office under the
home state title in the host state to provide legal assistance and
counsel on the home state domestic law, Community law, and
international law. A host state would not seem to be able to
claim that a "general good" interest exists to justify restricting
advice on those subjects to host state lawyers.' 60
The Court might also apply the "general good" principle
to allow a host state to require that the established lawyer be
subject to host state professional rules and disciplinary pro-
ceedings (which is again the approach of the CCBE draft).
This might be seen as a necessary implication of the holding in
Gullung. On the other hand, it could be argued that propor-
tionality requires the narrowest exception to the establishment
right, so that if the home state authorities energetically and ef-
fectively accept their responsibility to police the conduct of
their legal professionals when practicing abroad, the home
state rules and disciplinary proceedings can be relied upon to
protect the host state's legitimate concern for protection of
consumer interests and the administration of justice. If so,
ber State interests, otherwise recognized as appropriate, that limit one of the "four
freedoms." See, for example, the Court's landmark judgment rejecting excessive
health and consumer protection claims of Germany in a free movement of goods
case, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein, Case 120/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon], and the
equally important judgment rejecting France's public policy justifications for a re-
striction of free movement of workers, Roland Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case
36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140.
159. Irene Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium ftir Justiz, Bundes-und Europaan-
gelegenheiten Baden Wiirttemberg, Case C-340/89, slip op. 15-22 (Eur. Ct. J.
May 7, 1991) (not yet reported); Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno
Klopp, Case 107/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2971, 2990, 20-21, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 99, 114.
ProfessorJulian Lonbay, in his note on Vlassopoulou, supra note 107, suggests that "it
is quite probable, in the light of Vlassopoulou, that the proportionality test would be
applied to national rules that unnecessarily blocked access to the national legal mar-
ket." Id. at 519.
160. Even adversaries of the claim that Community lawyers have the right to
establish themselves under the home state title tend to admit this point. Cf. Rainer
Hofmann, 1992 and the Freedom of Establishment for Lawyers, INT'L LEGAL PRAC., Mar.
1990, at 7, 8.
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there would be no objective need to subject the established
Community foreign lawyer to the host state rules.
In conclusion, it is evident that there are thorny issues in-
volved in deciding whether a lawyer should have a right of es-
tablishment in another state under the home title and home
state supervision. Should the case come before the Court, it is
to be hoped that it will seriously weigh the beneficial implica-
tions for the integration of the Community legal profession in
allowing such practice, as a counter-weight to the undoubtedly
eloquent host state arguments in favor of requiring foreign
lawyers to join its legal profession in order to ensure respect
for local professional rules.
C. Establishment Rights for Law Firms
The CCBE draft directive on establishment describes
rights for law firms in article 11, Practice in Association. The
term "association" is presumably intended to cover full part-
nerships as well as any looser contractual arrangement. Article
11 covers two basic rights: foreign lawyers may establish
branches of a home state association in a host state, and for-
eign lawyers may enter into an association with host state law-
yers in a host state. In both caseq, limits are placed on the
rights. For example, the foreign lawyers or association must
be subject to the host state professional rules, and an associa-
tion must supply host state authorities with pertinent informa-
tion about the association.
The CCBE draft in this respect would represent a desira-
ble step forward, because the rights of law firms to establish
themselves in host states are not always clearly recognized at
the present time. For the sake of convenience in further analy-
sis, we will define a law firm as a partnership of lawyers,
although recognizing that some legal systems (notably France,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain) allow law firms to be established
in a company form.
Article 52 of the Treaty states the right of "self-employed
persons . . . to set up and manage undertakings, in particular
companies or firms." Moreover, Article 58 states that "compa-
nies or firms" are supposed to be "treated in the same way as
natural persons" in terms of establishment rights. Article 58
defines "firms" as including those constituted under civil as
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well as commercial law, so that professional partnerships
formed under the civil law are clearly firms.
Certainly law firms are "firms" of "self-employed per-
sons" in the sense of Article 52 and, as such, do enjoy rights of
establishment. However, Article 52 stipulates that the estab-
lishment rights are subject to "the conditions laid down for its
own nationals" by the host state.
There is no reason to doubt that a foreign law partnership
should have the right to set up a branch in a host state, just as
the Court of Justice held that an individual lawyer had that
right in Klopp. 6 ' Of course, if an individual foreign lawyer is
properly subject to limitations on the exercise of the legal pro-
fession justified by the "general good" in host states, so too
should be the foreign law firm. Thus, if ultimately it should be
concluded that foreign lawyers may only practice in the host
state as integrated members of a local bar, then a foreign law
firm's resident partners, or at least some of them, would also
have to be integrated members of the local bar. If, conversely,
it is ultimately concluded (as contended in Part VII.B) that for-
eign lawyers do have a right of establishment under their home
title, then a foreign law firm should likewise have the right to
have its resident partners practice under their home title.
A foreign law firm's branch in the host state should have
an accessory right to use the home state firm name. Although
some states have professional rules requiring only, or preemi-
nently, the use of the names of resident partners to identify the
branch office (e.g., on firm letterhead, business cards, or office
doors), it can be strongly contended that preventing the use of
the home state firm name prevents clients (as consumers) from
receiving information that they ought to obtain immediately,
i.e., the branch office link to the home office. After all, a law
firm name serves the same function as a trade name for a com-
mercial enterprise: it conveys to clients a sense of the reputa-
tion or quality of the firm. Accordingly, a -host state rule for-
bidding the use of the home state firm name should be consid-
ered to be disproportionate, not justified by the "general
161. The Court referred to the right of a branch office under Article 52 as being
"applicable equally to the liberal professions." Klopp, [1984] E.C.R. at 2990, 19,
[1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 113-14. The Court did not limit its statement to individual
lawyers. Moreover, Article 58 states that firms are to be treated in the same way as
natural persons.
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good." ' 6 2 Article 11(5) of the CCBE draft directive on estab-
lishment permits the branch to use the home firm name, but
adds that the host state may require in addition the identifica-
tion of representative resident partners. This appears to be
both a suitable policy solution and an arrangement which is in
conformity with the Community law on establishment.
In addition to operating through branches, a Community
law firm should be able to form joint ventures or looser as-
sociations with lawyers or law firms in a host state. Lawyers
may make use of the European Economic Interest Grouping
(EEIG), a sort of statutory joint venture authorized by a 1985
Council regulation, 163 and indeed some law firms have formed
EEIGs. 164 But law firms are not obliged to form EEIGs in or-
der to cooperate, and many prefer to use other contractual
forms of relations among firms in different states for cross-bor-
der practice. If two or more law firms create a partnership or a
joint venture office in a host state, as is increasingly common in
Brussels, Frankfurt, London, and other centers, then the Com-
munity participants are creating either ajoint branch office or a
new firm, in either case justified under Article 52. If the joint
venture or association is among two or more firms from differ-
ent Community states, with no joint office or interchange of
legal personnel (or interchange only for training purposes),
then the applicable Article permitting this would seem to be
59, as each firm is only facilitating its cross-border practice
through the cooperative relationship with the other firm or
firms.
162. In GB-INNO-BM v. Conf6diration du Commerce Luxembourgeois, Case
362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 801, the Court of Justice held that
Luxembourg could not limit cross-border advertising by a Belgian supermarket chain
on consumer protection grounds. The Court stressed that consumer protection
could not justify a restriction on the amount of accurate information provided to the
consumer. By analogy, a host state should not be able to limit the amount of infor-
mation provided to law firm clients about the nature of a law firm and its affiliates.
163. Council Regulation No. 2137/85 of July 25, 1985 on the European Eco-
nomic Interest Grouping (EEIG), 0"J. L 199/1 (1985). EEIGs are intended to be a
vehicle for cross-border cooperation between Community companies and firms in
virtually any type of operation ancillary to the parties' principal activity. EEIGs are
not limited to commercial enterprises and are being used by accounting and medical
professionals, as well as by law firms. See Severine Israel, The EEIC--A Major Step
Forward for Community Law, 9 COMPANY LAw. 14 (1988).
164. An EEIG created between Belgian, Dutch, and German law firms is de-
scribed in Putting All Your EEIGs in One Basket, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1989, at 20.
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In either case, Article 52 or 59 certainly would seem to
prevent states from barring law firm joint venture or associa-
tion relationships as such, leaving open the issue of the extent
to which host states may place limits on them for the "general
good." The limits that host states may place upon practice by
joint venture offices or associations formed by Community
firms would appear to be essentially the same as those host
state limits, discussed above, that are appropriate for branch
offices of Community law firms. Accordingly, it would appear
that a host state should not be able to prevent a local joint
venture branch office, or a host state firm that is part of such a
joint venture or association, from making reference to any as-
sociation name, or the relation among the firms comprising the
joint venture or association, on its firm stationery or business
cards.
The next issue to consider is whether law firms from two
states can either merge, or form a new partnership, and
whether a foreign law firm can have host state lawyers as part-
ners in its host state branch. In principle, the right to do this
should flow from Article 52, but there is perhaps a stronger
argument for host state limitations on the right.
It can certainly be contended, based on the host state's
duty under Article 5 to further rights of establishment, as ar-
ticulated in Thieffry and Klopp, that a host state should not be
able to totally forbid cross-border firm mergers or partner-
ships, or the association of host state lawyers in a foreign law
partnership. Protection of "general good" interests may en-
able the host state to require the entity in question to register
or provide pertinent information, to use a firm name that
clearly identifies the entity, and to require that all host state
lawyers and established foreign lawyers follow host state pro-
fessional rules (where these are objectively justified). This is
essentially the approach taken by the CCBE in article 11 of its
draft directive on establishment.165 However, there appear to
be no "general good" considerations that would require a host
state lawyer who has become a partner in a foreign Community
165. Article 11 (3) of the CCBE Draft Directive, supra note 117, creates an excep-
tion for the United Kingdom and Ireland as to U.K. and Irish barristers. By tradi-
tional rules of conduct, they are forbidden to be partners even with other barristers,
although they may share expenses in chambers.
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law firm to lose his or her status as a fully qualified member of
the host state legal profession, or to limit his or her right to
appear in host state court or administrative proceedings. Any
limitation of this sort would appear disproportionate, because
there is no basis for considering that the host state lawyer's
partnership status would impair his or her independent fulfill-
ment of host state professional rules.' 66
In conclusion, even though no Community legislation
presently exists, it is submitted that law firms do have rights of
establishment under Article 52 and that these rights may not
be disproportionately limited by host states. Because the
CCBE draft directive on establishment would appear to ad-
vance the recognition of establishment rights of law firms in a
suitable manner, it is to be hoped that it will ultimately be en-
dorsed by the CCBE and that it will incite the Commission to
propose a directive inspired by its text.
D. Applicable Rules of Conduct 167
No issue in cross-border practice of law is more intricate
than that of the appropriate applicable rules of conduct. 68
That is why the CCBE Code of Conduct should be applauded
166. Some Community states require courtroom lawyers to resign from the pro-
fession or cease to have the right to appear in litigation whenever they become em-
ployees of a commercial enterprise or anyone else who is not a courtroom lawyer.
Assuming that such a rule is justified by the "general good," which is debatable, it
presumably is premised on the idea that an employee lawyer has lost his or her inde-
pendence. That premise does not apply to a host state lawyer who has become a
partner in a foreign Community law firm.
167. For a review of national rules of professional conduct and ethics within the
Community, see generally CCBE CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note
1; LAGUETrE, supra note 1, at 123-67; SPEDDING, supra note 1, at 91-119.
168. The issue of applicable rules of conduct in interstate practice has become a
serious one in the United States. Thirty-four states have adopted versions of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, while sixteen have retained the earlier Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, or mixed the Model Rules and the Model Code.
See MODEL RULES ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1983) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]; MODEL CODE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (BNA) PO
1:3-4. An analysis of conflict rules is only beginning, and there is great uncertainty
as to the proper approach. It is to be hoped that the American Law Institute's cur-
rent draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers will provide sorely-needed guidance.
See ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of Rules of Professional
Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the States, 45 Bus. LAw. 1229
(1990); Stanley Kaplan, Professional Responsibility: Which State's Rules Apply?, INSIGHTS,
Feb. 1988, at 17.
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as a highly useful initiative. On the other hand, it must be rec-
ognized that, although the Code undoubtedly went as far in
setting standards as its draftsmen were able to go, the Code,
still does not go far enough.
A major reason why the issue of applicable rules of con-
duct is so intricate is that too little expert analysis has been
made of the core concepts and essential scope of specific pro-
fessional rules of conduct and ethics in Community states.
Some professional rules attempt to articulate ethical stan-
dards, 69 others indicate a responsible mode of assisting courts
and other instruments of justice, 70 others attempt to protect
client interests, 71 still others relate to the organization of the
profession and protection of its reputation, 72 and, finally,
some rules simply represent traditional modes of carrying out
the professional activity.' 7 3 Moreover, in some states, national
rules of professional conduct were developed many years ago
and have not been seriously re-examined in light of modem
practice. 74 As a result, some national rules and practices may
be out of date and might well be appropriately modified by
169. E.g., rules on a lawyer's honesty, integrity, truthfulness, and avoidance of
fraud.
170. E.g., rules on adherence to court procedures, on demeanor in court, and
on respect for judges.
171. E.g., rules on competent and diligent representation of clients, on the
avoidance of conflicts of interest, on protection of confidential client communica-
tions, on the segregation of, or other safeguards for client funds, and on professional
malpractice insurance or guarantee funds.
172. E.g., rules on membership in bar associations or councils and acceptance of
their disciplinary proceedings, on professional courtesy between adversaries, on fee
schedules and referral fees, and on the responsibility for training of young lawyers (in
systems which require supervised practice training).
173. E.g., rules on advertising, incompatibility of lawyer's status with other pro-
fessional or commercial position (for example, a prohibition of a lawyer's service on a
board of directors), or the former French uniciti rule forbidding practice out of more
than one office.
174. As noted above, the CCBE has working groups reviewing a number of ar-
eas where national rules may merit revision to bring them in line with modern prac-
tice views, for example, on advertising, protection of confidential communications,
fees, and multi-disciplinary professional partnerships. It is to be hoped that these
will result in recommendations to national lawyers' associations, or at least that the
process of review will stimulate initiatives for revision in some states. It is quite evi-
dent that the U.S. legal profession benefitted greatly from the analytical review of
rules which occurred in the process of the American Bar Association's adoption of
the Model Rules in 1983, and is benefitting now from the careful examination of
rules, case law, and ethics panel decisions as the American Law Institute works on the
draft Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.
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more modern approaches.' 75 It is also possible that some na-
tional rules should be identified as appropriate to certain types
of practice, but not others. Finally, some national rules, which
may be perfectly proper for domestic legal practice, may not
be objectively justified by the "general good" and accordingly
should not represent limitations on cross-border legal prac-
tice.
Another complicating factor is the absence to date of care-
ful analysis of choice of law principles as applied to this field.
Such analysis is all the more necessary inasmuch as modern
views on the appropriate manner to decide upon choice of law
in substantive conflict of laws have evolved considerably in re-
cent years. 176
Turning now to some comments on Community rules on
applicable rules of conduct, we have already referred in Part
VII.A to the unsatisfactory state of the choice of rule provi-
sions in the 1977 directive on lawyers' freedom to provide
services. 177
First, with regard to "legal proceedings" (criminal and
civil litigation) and proceedings before public authorities, arti-
cle 4(2) states that the service-providing foreign lawyer "shall
observe the rules of professional conduct of the host Member
State, without prejudice to his obligations" in his home Mem-
ber State.178 What does this mean? Although presumably the
fundamental intent was to insure that the service-providing
lawyer would comply with the host state rules on adherence to
judicial or administrative procedures and on demeanor in
court, article 4(2) goes beyond that to require adherence to all
host state rules of professional conduct. Presumably, the
phrase, "without prejudice" to home state "obligations," also
was intended to suggest that the lawyer is usually considered
to be bound by home rules no matter where he or she provides
services.
175. ProfessorJulian Lonbay in his note on Vlassopoulou, supra note 107, at 516-
17, commented on the protective effects of limiting certain types of practice to tradi-
tional classes of legal professionals and their rules in some Community states.
176. It may be that conflict of laws rules for substantive law are not appropriate
for conflicts of professional rules and new approaches need to be found. See ABA
Committee on Counsel Responsibility, supra note 168.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
178. Lawyers Directive, supra note 39, OJ. L 78/17 (1977).
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But suppose there is a conflict between home and host
state rules. For example, may a foreign lawyer whose home
rules permit contingent fees accept one for a civil litigation in a
host state whose rules forbid such fees? In the alternative, may
a foreign lawyer whose home rules forbid contingent fees ac-
cept one for a civil litigation in a host state whose rules allow
such fees? Should the host state rules always prevail on the
theory that the "without prejudice" wording of article 4(a) im-
plicitly means that host state rules take priority in case of con-
flict? Or should the stricter rule, which in this case would be
the rule against contingent fees, prevail? Note that Rule 3.3 of
the Code of Conduct generally forbids contingent fees in
cross-border practice, with limited exceptions, which suggests
that the CCBE considered that the stricter rule should prevail
in this case.
In contrast, Rule 3.4 of the Code provides that client fees
in general should be regulated by home state rules. That
would mean that a foreign lawyer whose home state rules do
not fix a specific fee schedule would not have to follow the ob-
ligatory fee schedule of a host state in which services are being
provided. While that seems sound policy, is Rule 3.4 consis-
tent with a strict interpretation of article 4(1) of the 1977 direc-
tive?
An even more difficult issue would arise if there is a signif-
icant difference between home and host state rules as to the
extent of the privilege for confidential client communications,
or professional secrecy. May a foreign lawyer whose home
rules strictly protect client confidences disclose some aspect of
them in a court proceeding in a host state where the court has
the power to require such disclosure? In the alternative, may a
foreign lawyer refrain from disclosing a client's fraud on the
court in a court proceeding in a host state where a lawyer has
no right to breach the client's confidence in this regard, de-
spite the fact that the home state rules require the lawyer to
disclose such a fraud on the court? (This issue may also arise
in the United States, as some states now require a lawyer to
disclose a client's fraudulent conduct during litigation, while
others forbid such disclosure.' 79)
179. See ABA Committee on Counsel Responsibility, supra note 168, at 1231,
1238-39 (discussing Maryland State Bar Committee on Ethics opinion allowing Mary-
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Rule 2.3 on confidentiality of the CCBE Code of Conduct
states the principle in a fairly absolute fashion ("A lawyer shall
accordingly respect the confidentiality of all information given
to him by his client"), but later Rule 4.4 forbids a lawyer from
giving "false or misleading information to the court." Which
rule should govern in trying to decide the question whether a
lawyer must inform the court of a fraud on the court by the
client? Moreover, does Rule 4.1, which requires a foreign law-
yer to comply with a host state's court's rules of conduct, imply
that the foreign lawyer may have to disclose client confidences
if a host state court, consonant with its rules, should order the
disclosure?
The proper resolution of these issues is by no means evi-
dent. What is clear is that article 4(1) of the 1977 directive
does not give sufficient guidance. It may well be that article
4(1) ought to be amended to restrict the compulsory applica-
tion of host state rules more precisely to the procedural rules
of host state courts and tribunals and to direct obligations of
the foreign lawyer to the judge or tribunal, while specifying
that home state rules should otherwise be applicable. As for
the CCBE Code of Conduct, though helpful, its rules still need
to be supplemented by further analysis on conflict resolution.
Assistance may be provided in this regard by the CCBE Work-
ing Groups studying some of these topics mentioned in Part
VI.t 80
Even more troublesome is the ambiguity of the text in arti-
cle 4(4) of the 1977 directive concerning services other than
litigation, because standard corporate and commercial practice
represents the vast bulk of cross-border legal services. Article
4(4) states that the foreign lawyer shall be subject to the home
state rules "without prejudice to respect for the rules" of the
host state, especially rules on incompatible business activities,
professional secrecy, relations with other lawyers, conflicts of
interest and publicity (advertising). However, the foreign law-
yer's obligation to observe these host rules is limited to the
extent that the rules are "objectively justified to ensure, in that
land lawyers to fail to disclose a client's fraud on the court in a D.C. proceeding,
when that conformed to the D.C. rule, while the Maryland rule would require disclo-
sure).
180. See supra text accompanying note 114.
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state, the proper exercise of a lawyer's activities, the standing
of the profession and respect for the rules concerning incom-
patibility ' 8  Once again, it is not clear which set of rules
should have priority in case of conflict, while the likelihood of
conflict is rather high due to substantial differences in state
rules on these matters.
The fact that article 4(4) names certain types of host state
rules as those particularly to be taken into consideration may
mean that the draftsmen intended to have these host state
rules prevail over home state rules in case of conflict. How-
ever, the "without prejudice" formula would normally seem to
give priority to the home state rules. Moreover, even if one
reads article 4(4) to give priority to the named types of host
state rules, this is limited to those which are "objectively justi-
fied," which means that an analysis must be made of the rela-
tive importance of the host state rules.
In this context, the CCBE Code of Conduct is helpful be-
cause it tries to harmonize some concepts (e.g., Rule 2.3 on
confidentiality, Rule 3.2 on conflicts of interest) and to supply
choices of rules as to others (e.g., host state rules shall apply as
to incompatible occupations, Rule 2.5, and as to advertising,
Rule 2.6, while home state rules apply as to fees in general,
Rule 3.4). Nonetheless, the possibility of conflicts continues to
exist.
In particular, because states do vary in their concept of the
nature and extent of the protection of confidential communica-
tions between lawyers and clients (common law states tend to
see this as a client's privilege, while civil law states tend to view
it as a lawyer's right, with significant differences in application
arising from the different legal theories), and in their concept
of what constitutes a conflict of interest and how it may be
waived by clients, it would be helpful if experts on professional
rules and ethics carefully tried to determine the proper key
concepts to be applied universally, if any exist, and to resolve
conflicts among different approaches. (Perhaps the CCBE
Working Groups, referred to earlier, will help in this process.)
Moreover, further reflection would be helpful on whether the
types of host state rules that article 4(4) of the draft directive
lists as perhaps prevailing over home state rules can properly
181. Lawyers Directive, supra note 39, O.J. L 78/17 (1977).
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be considered to be objectively justified for the "general
good," notably restrictions on advertising or forms of fee ar-
rangements, which may reflect traditional. attitudes in some
states but may no longer be so essential to society or the legal
profession.182
Thus far we have concentrated on professional rules af-fecting cross-border services. Difficult issues also arise as to
established lawyers. First, consider the case of a foreign lawyer
who becomes a member of the host state bar. In that case, he
or she is clearly bound by the professional rules of the host
state. However, as the various national submissions made to
the Court of Justice in Klopp indicate, such a lawyer also re-
mains subject to the professional rules of the home state.'8 3
What should happen in the case of conflict between home and
host states, both purportedly binding? 8 4
If the host state rules cover a subject not covered by home
state rules or are stricter than the home state rules, the host
state rules certainly should prevail. Accordingly, if the home
state rules permit lawyers' advertising or contingent fees, or
are silent on the subject, while the host state rules forbid them,
then the lawyer established in the host state must follow the
host state rules.
Now suppose the home state rules are the stricter ones-
for example, the home state forbids advertising, or contingent
fees, or service as a member of a corporation's board of direc-
tors, while the host state rules permit them or are silent on the
subject. Should the foreign lawyer be bound by such rules
while established in practice in the host state? Unless the
home state authorities grant a waiver of the rule in question,
the answer presumably is yes. This is because the host state in
no way requires such conduct but only permits it, and because
182. A review on current state rules on lawyers' advertising is contained in Al-
bert Tanghe, Publish and Be Damned-Local Bar Publicity Restrictions, 1 LAw. IN EUR. 3(1990). The trend in Europe seems to be toward a more permissive attitude toward
advertising, notably in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
183. See supra text accompanying note 83. It is worth noting that Rule 8.5 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer is subject to the Model
Rules and the home state disciplinary process even though engaged in practice else-
where, and a comment suggests that conflicts of law rules should decide any conflict
between home and host state rules.
184. For my earlier reflections on this subject, particularly as to conflicts when
U.S. lawyers practice abroad, see Goebel, supra note 1, at 520-22.
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the lawyer voluntarily has chosen to remain subject to home
state rules by not resigning from the home state legal profes-
sion. However, it is possible that the home state authorities
will choose not to impose a serious disciplinary sanction for
the violation of home state rules if the violation occurs in the
host state in such a case.1
8 5
Another difficult question is what should happen when a
lawyer's prospective relation with a new client would constitute
a conflict of interest with an earlier client under home state
rules, but not under those of the host state. Should it matter
whether the lawyer served the earlier client in the home state
or only began service of the earlier client in the host state?
Arguably, in the latter case both the lawyer and the client ex-
pect their relations to be governed only by host state rules.
That would not be the case where the earlier lawyer-client rela-
tionship began in the home state. Rule 3.2 of the CCBE Code
of Conduct attempts to define a basic conflict of interest, but
states still will have differing rules in their appraisal of the risk
of conflict in practice, as well as with respect to the permissibil-
ity of waivers of conflict from clients.
Article 9 of the CCBE draft directive on establishment
covers host state disciplinary proceedings of foreign lawyers
who have become members of the host state legal profession.
Article 9 allows the home state authorities to be represented in
the host state proceeding, thus permitting comments on any
issue of conflict between home and host state rules. The
CCBE's Council for Advice and Arbitration, whose purpose is
to assist in resolving conflicts of rules, may be able to help in
such a proceeding. Moreover, article 9(6) specifies that the
disciplinary panel should be capable of referring questions of
Community law to the Court of Justice, which enables an au-
thoritative resolution of difficult conflict issues.'
86
One must also consider the case of a lawyer or law firm
established in a host state under the home state title. At pres-
ent, such lawyers or firmsconsider themselves subject to home
185. The Danish government made a comment along these lines in its response
to the Court in Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, Case 107/83,
[1984] E.C.R. 2971, 2979-80, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 99, 104.
186. The Court ofJustice has accepted that a bar council can be a tribunal with
the right to refer questions under Article 177. In rejean Razanatsimba, Case 65/77,
[1977] E.C.R. 2229, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 246.
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state rules and discipline, except if they engage occasionally in
host state litigation, in which case they would clearly be subject
to host state rules pursuant to article 4(1) of the 1977 directive
on legal services.
As discussed above, articles 8 and 10 of the CCBE draft
directive on establishment would require such established law-
yers to become subject to host state rules and disciplinary pro-
ceedings. This is presumably intended as an inducement to
host states to allow foreign lawyers to establish themselves
outside of the local legal profession.
The CCBE, however, does make two exceptions to the ap-
plication of host state rules: first, the Code of Conduct is to
prevail over host state rules if there is a conflict, and second,
host state rules apply only to the extent that they are "objec-
tively justified by the public interest" (Rule 8(2)). This is un-
doubtedly intended to represent a synthesis of the Court's
views in Reyners, Thieffry, and Klopp.
It is conceivable that if the Court of Justice should have
occasion to decide upon the status of foreign lawyers estab-
lished under the home title in host states, in the absence of any
Community legislation, the Court would extend the establish-
ment right of Article 52 to such lawyers, but subject such es-
tablished lawyers to host state rules, provided they are objec-
tively justified.' 8 7 At some point in time, therefore, it may be
necessary for the Court to determine whether compulsory fee
schedules, restrictions on advertising or on contingent fees, or
rules of professional incompatibility with service on corporate
boards of directors, can be said to be objectively justified for
the "general good" in modern legal practice. The answer is
debatable. It is arguable that one or more of these rules,
although traditional in many states, may not be sufficiently im-
portant to restrict lawyers' establishment rights, as in the case
of France's rule obliging lawyers to maintain only one office,
considered in Klopp.188
187. It is also conceivable that, as discussed above in the text accompanying
note 157, the Court will take the contrary view and conclude that foreign lawyers may
only establish themselves in host states as members of the host state profession, un-
less Community legislation determines otherwise.
188. Restrictions on advertising appeal to many lawyers, who believe that adver-
tising lowers the public image of lawyers: Nonetheless, such restrictions on advertis-
ing have nothing to do with ethical standards or the administration ofjustice. As for
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Article 10 of the CCBE draft directive on establishment
gives the host state authorities the power to conduct discipli-
nary proceedings against the established foreign lawyer prac-
ticing under the home state title, without prejudice to any dis-
ciplinary proceedings taken in the home state. Article 10 rep-
resents a compromise between host state and home state
interests, because it provides for a joint disciplinary' body,
although weighted 3-2 in favor of the host state. Although ar-
ticle 10 thus requires that home state authorities be repre-
sented on the disciplinary panel, this may not go far enough,
particularly in a case where the issue is one of compliance with
a host state rule that is different in scope from, or even in con-
flict with, a home state rule. However, article 10 cross-refer-
ences to article 9(6), so that the "mixed" panel should be able
to refer difficult questions to the Court of Justice.
In conclusion, it is clear that there are difficult issues as to
the applicable professional and ethical rules to be applied to
foreign lawyers, either those providing services or those estab-
lished and practicing in one form or another in a host state.
The CCBE Code of Conduct is definitely quite valuable.
Adoption of the CCBE draft directive on establishment as the
basis for a Commission proposal for legislation would also be
very helpful. Nevertheless, much serious thinking and careful
analysis remains to be done in this area, because the un-
resolved issues are important and intricate.
VIII. REFLECTIONS ON U.S.-E.C. CROSS-BORDER
PRACTICE
Although the basic purpose of this Article is to review
Community law on Community lawyers' rights, it would be in-
complete without a review of the status of U.S. lawyers and law
firms in the European Community. This Part is divided into
consumer interests, the more modern view is that advertising brings more informa-
tion to the consumer and hence only unfair or misleading advertising should be pro-
hibited. See GB-INNO-BM v. Conf6d6ration du Commerce Luxembourgeois, Case
362/88, [1990] E.C.R. 667, [1991) 2 C.M.L.R. 801. As for restrictions on lawyers'
service in allegedly incompatible occupations, this again seems chiefly justified by a
concern for the image of the profession. Any conflict of interest concern can be met
by more limited restrictions, such as a prohibition of a lawyer's representation of a
corporate client on whose board he or she serves, or the representation of a party in
litigation against a corporate entity on whose board the lawyer serves.
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two sections: a review of Community law principles applicable
to U.S. lawyers, and some reflections on how cross-border
practice between the U.S. and the E.C. can be furthered.
A. The Status of U.S. Lawyers in Community Law
A basic principle of European Community law is that
rights based on the Treaty are available only to Community
nationals, while the nationals and enterprises of non-Commu-
nity states derive particular rights within the Community only
when Community legislation or agreements between the Com-
munity and third states specifically accord them.' 89 This prin-
ciple also applies to rights to provide services under Article 59
and the right of establishment under Article 52.
189. Thus, in Elestina Esselina Christina Morson and Sewradjie Jhanjan v. the
Netherlands, Joined Cases 35 & 36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, [1983]2 C.M.L.R. 221,
Surinamese nationals, parents of Dutch nationals, could not claim rights under Arti-
cle 48 or Regulation No. 1612/68,J.O. L 257/2 (1968), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, 11,
at 475, as dependent family members of workers because their Dutch children were
not migrant workers in another Community state and Regulation No. 1612/68 only
grants rights to non-Community dependents of migrant workers. Morson is an exam-
ple of the "internal affairs" doctrine, by which the internal law of a Community state
alone is to be applied in cases where parties cannot demonstrate ajurisdictional basis
to apply Community law. Accord Criminal Proceedings Against Guy Bekaert, Case
204/87, [1988] E.C.R. 2029, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 655, where the Court held that a
French enterprise could not claim any protection based on Article 52 against French
regulations governing retail trade.
Occasionally a Community international agreement has been construed to grant
rights to foreign nationals. In Office National de I'Emploi v. Bahia Kziber, Case C-
18/90, [1991 ] E.C.R. 199, a Moroccan national, residing in Belgium with her father,
a retired migrant worker, was held to have a right to Belgian unemployment benefits
on the basis of national treatment clause in the Community association agreement
with Morocco. But see Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwibisch Gmiind, Case 12/86,
[1987] E.C.R. 3719, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1989] 1 CEC 3, which held that the
language of the Community association agreement with Turkey was too vague and
general to grant specific rights of free movement to Turkish workers. See also EMI
Records Ltd. v. CBS UK Ltd., Case 51/75, [1976] E.C.R. 811, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 235,
which held that a U.S. owner of the "Columbia" trademark could not market records
under that mark in the United Kingdom, where a U.K. entity owned the same mark,
in application of the Community law "common source" exception to protection of
trademark rights, because that doctrine could not be relied upon by the owners of
non-Community trademarks. The Court held that no protection for non-Community
firms could be derived from a broad interpretation of Article 113 on the common
commercial policy of the Community in its external trade. The Court reached the
same conclusion in a narrow interpretation of the EC-EFTA agreement as to record
imports into the United Kingdom under an infringing trademark from the then-
EFTA state, Portugal, in Polydor Ltd. and RSO Records Ltd. v. Harlequin Record
Shops Ltd. and Simon Records Ltd., Case 270/80, [1982] E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1
C.M.L.R. 677.
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Thus, in In re Jean Razanatsimba, the Court held that the
1975 Lome Convention between the Community and approxi-
mately sixty African, Caribbean, and Pacific island states did
not enable a Madagascar national, who had obtained a French
law degree and passed the French bar examination, to claim a
right to be admitted to the French bar based on Article 52.90
This was despite the fact that the Lom6 Convention's Article
62 guaranteed "non-discriminatory" treatment to Lome state
nationals. France was held to have the power to limit accession
to the status of avocat to French and Community nationals.
The implication of Razanatsimba is that a Community agree-
ment with third states would have to grant in specific terms a
right of establishment in the Community to foreign lawyers or
other professionals.' 9'
The Community legislation affecting lawyers based on Ar-
ticles 52 and 59 grant no rights to non-Community nationals as
such. As noted before, article 1 of the 1988 directive on the
recognition of higher-education diplomas restricts its scope to
nationals of Member States. 92 However, the 1977 directive on
lawyers' freedom to provide services grants rights on the basis
of a person's status as a member of one of the listed Member
State legal professions in article 1(2). l ' Presumably, this
would mean that a U.S. lawyer who has been able to attain the
status of member of such a legal profession (for example, as a
French or Belgian avocat, which is now possible under the rules
in those states) would have the right to provide services under
that title (but not as a member of a U.S. state bar) in other
Community states.
Moreover, some persons who simultaneously have U.S.
citizenship and citizenship in a Member State may be able to
qualify as members of the legal profession in that Member
190. Razanatsimba, [1977] E.C.R. 2971, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 99. It is possible that
the specific holding of Razanatsimba as to the interpretation of the non-discrimination
article of the Lom6 Convention has been tacitly overruled by the Court's broader
construction of a similar provision in the Community's association agreement with
Morocco in Kziber, [1991] E.C.R. 199.
191. As noted earlier, it appears that the 1992 European Economic Area agree-
ment will grant partial rights of establishment and provision of services as between
the Community and EFTA states, insofar as the 1977 and 1988 directives will have to
be implemented by EFTA states. See supra text accompanying note 100.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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State. If so, and that profession is one listed in article 1(1) of
the 1977 directive, they also could provide services under their
Member State title in other Community states. Such dual na-
tionals, however, cannot use the terms of the 1988 directive to
obtain recognition of their U.S. law degrees in order to be-
come a lawyer in a Member State, because the directive only
covers diplomas provided by Member State institutions.'9 4
A branch of a U.S. law firm in a Member State acquires
rights only in that state. For Community law purposes, a
branch is not a legal entity entitled to establishment or service-
providing rights under Articles 52 and 59, but only an exten-
sion of the foreign head office.' 95 Accordingly, a U.S. firm with
a branch in a Member State cannot use that branch to create
sub-branches in other Member States. Fortunately for U.S.
firms, many Member States have either traditionally taken a
liberal attitude toward branch offices of reputable foreign law
firms, or have recently modified their rules in that direction, so
that a U.S. law firm's inability to claim Community rights of
establishment does not presently seem to pose a major hin-
drance to their practice in Europe. 96
It is possible that as further steps are taken toward an inte-
grated Community market in legal services, through further di-
rectives or Court of Justice case law, or both, the attitude of
Member States and their bar associations will become progres-
sively more liberal and less chauvinistic, so that U.S. law firms
will have expanded opportunities to practice. If so, the ab-
194. A Council Recommendation of Dec. 21, 1988 concerning nationals of
member states who hold a diploma conferred in a third state, O.J. L 19/24 (1989),
supplements the 1988 directive with a non-binding recommendation that a Member
State recognize a non-Community state's diplomas in a manner analogous to Com-
munity diplomas. This may particularly prove helpful to U.S./Irish and U.S./English
or Scottish dual nationals, because of the resemblances between common law legal
education systems.
195. This has particularly been brought to the attention of U.S. firms through
the provisions of the Second Banking Directive, supra note 62, O.J. L 386/1 (1989),
which allows a Community subsidiary of a U.S. bank to derive rights to Community-
wide banking, but leaves U.S. bank branches to qualify on a state-by-state basis if they
can. See the 19th whereas clause of the Second Banking Directive.
196. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have for
years had a liberal policy toward U.S. law firms and the 1989 German legislation also
allows U.S. firm branches on condition of reciprocity. There do not appear to be
serious barriers to U.S. firm branches presently except in France (for firms that have
"grandfather" status under the 1990 law) and Luxembourg. See the news articles
cited supra in notes 8-10.
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sence of direct Community rights will not prove very signifi-
cant.
It is also worth noting that U.S. law firms may be able to
make indirect use of Community law practice rights accorded
to qualified Community lawyers who are associated with the
U.S. firm. For example, if the Brussels bar permits some form
of association between a U.S. firm and an avocat firm, the U.S.
firm can enable their clients to obtain full use of the Commu-
nity rights of the Belgian avocats. Moreover, if under the new
U.K. rules for solicitors, a U.S. law firm and a U.K. solicitors'
firm merge to create a new partnership in the United King-
dom, 97 that partnership could exercise Community law rights
to the extent described previously in Part VII.C.' 98 There may
be other ingenious ways for U.S. firms to make indirect use of
Community law practice rights, but it must be stressed that in
no case does a U.S. lawyer established under his or her U.S.
state title acquire rights of Community practice; it is only the
U.S. firm that can provide its clients with services rendered by
Community lawyers who are associated with the U.S. firm.
Finally, one should note a specific and quite irritating
problem for U.S. lawyers specializing in Community competi-
tion law. In a famous 1982 judgment, AM & S Europe Ltd. v.
Commission, the Court of Justice recognized for the first time an
attorney-client confidential communication privilege.' 99 This
was a landmark in basic rights protection in the Community,
because the Court reached its conclusion on the basis of the
common legal traditions of the Member States even though
neither the EEC Treaty nor any Community legislation recog-
nized the privilege.
Unfortunately, in its judgment the Court limited the right
to confidentiality of lawyer-client communications to those
lawyers who figure on the list of recognized national legal pro-
197. See supra text accompanying note 9.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66. If the London firm partnership
is formed by merger into the U.S. firm, rather than by creating a new U.K. partner-
ship, then it is technically only a branch of a U.S. law firm and has no direct Commu-
nity rights.
199. Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264 (discussed in
Sandy Ghandhi, Legal Professional Privilege in European Community Law, 7 EUR. L. REV.
308 (1982); Helmut W. Kreis, The AM & SJudgment of the European Court ofJustice and
Its Consequences Within and Outside the Community, Swiss REV. INT'L ANTITRUST L., Feb.
1984, at 3).
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fessions in the 1977 directive on the freedom to provide legal
services.2 0 This means that client communications with U.S.
or other non-Community lawyers are not protected by the
privilege, except in the relatively rare case of a U.S. lawyer who
has managed to attain the status of a Member State lawyer on
the list.
Thus far, the EEC Commission has never attempted to
make use of a client communication with an outside U.S. coun-
sel.2 0' Moreover, while Commission officials working in the
Directorate General IV on competition policy are clearly dis-
posed to grant informally such a privilege to U.S. lawyers, the
Commission has not made a formal statement to this effect. A
protest of this state of affairs by the American Bar Association
in February 1984 has thus far not produced any result. 2  The
situation is all the more anomalous because case law in the
U.S. does recognize the attorney-client confidential communi-
cation privilege when the communication is with a foreign law-
yer.20 3 It is to be hoped that at some point the Commission
will be able to declare formally that the privilege is recognized
as to communications with U.S. lawyers, whether based in the
U.S. or the Community, and/or that the Court of Justice will
find occasion to extend the privilege to U.S. or other qualified
non-Community lawyers whose professional rules are compa-
rable to those of Community lawyers.
200. AM & S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1612, 26, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 324.
201. The Commission did make use of an in-house U.S. lawyer's legal memoran-
dum evaluating his employer's conduct in John Deere, O.J. L 35/58 (1985), [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 554 (noted in 11 EUR. L. REV. 85 (1986)).
202. See Kreis, supra note 199, at 10-11, 18-20. In 1984, the Commission pro-
posed to the Council of Ministers that negotations be opened with the United States
for treaty recognition of the attorney-client privilege on the basis of reciprocity. The
Council has never acted on this request.
203. Renfield Corp. v. E. R~my Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982)
(recognizing privilege for communications between U.S. subsidiary and French
house counsel of its parent French company (even though France does not recognize
privilege as to house counsel communications)); accord Mitts & Merrill, Inc. v. Shred
Pax Corp., 112 F.R.D. 349 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (privilege extended to communications
with German patent agent); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (privilege extended to communications with British and Canadian
patent agents); cf. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1989) (stating that proper rule is recognition of privilege to client com-
munications with any foreign lawyer).
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B. Furthering U.S. -E. C. Cross-Border Legal Practice
As indicated in section A, U.S. law firms are not encoun-
tering substantial difficulties in legal practice in most Commu-
nity states through branches or through association or close
correspondent arrangements with local firms. Correlatively, as
indicated in' Part I, ten U.S. states and the District of Columbia
have'created the status of legal consultant.20 4 There are over
thirty Community law firms with branch offices in New York.
Moreover, since U.S. citizenship is not a prerequisite for mem-
bership in a U.S. state bar since Griffith v. Connecticut,20 5 an in-
creasing number of European law students are succeeding in
passing the bar examination in New York and other states after
studying at U.S. law schools, usually in an LL.M. program. Ac-
cordingly, in general the state of U.S.-E.C. cross-border prac-
tice is good. Nonetheless, some concerns do exist.
The ABA House of Delegates in August 1991 adopted
several resolutions pursuant to a report of a special EC Task
Force, acting for the section of International Law and Practice
and the Business Law section. The ABA resolutions endorsed
the Community efforts to create an integrated internal market,
but added:
4. BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that measures adopted
by the European Community relating to the integration of
the legal profession should be designed so as to ensure the
preservation of the integrity of the legal profession and the
continued recognition of its distinctive characteristics and
responsibilities.
5. BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that measures adopted
by the European Community should not impose or permit
restrictions upon the delivery of legal services by members
of foreign legal professions that are not objectively required
for the protection of the public.2 °6
The report cited the 1977 and 1988 directives, as well as
the CCBE draft directive on establishment, and expressed con-
cern that
[t]he position of some of the Member States coupled with
204. See supra note 2.
205. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
206. A.B.A. Section of International Law & Practice, Section of Banking Law,
Report to the House of Delegates: The European Community, 24 Irr'L LAw. 1192 (1990).
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the lack of applicability of pertinent directives to third coun-
try lawyers provide the foundation for potentially discrimi-
natory treatment of U.S. lawyers engaging in legal activities
in Europe on behalf of their clients."
The Report concluded that
[t]he fourth and fifth proposed resolutions accordingly urge
the Community to eschew restrictions on the delivery of
legal services by foreign legal professionals to the extent
that these restrictions are not objectively required to pro-
tect the public. 20 8
Although the concern of the ABA is undoubtedly genuine,
it is not clear what should be done to alleviate the concern. As
indicated in Part VIII.A, the Treaty grants rights of establish-
ment and the provision of services to Community nationals, so
that Community legislation intended to further the Treaty
goals would, generally speaking, likewise be limited to Com-
munity nationals. Although the 1977 directive effectively
grants rights to non-Community nationals who have acquired
membership in the designated legal professions, that is an inci-
dental effect of the law of those Member States that allow non-
Community nationals to join their legal professions.
Presumably, the normal vehicle for assuring rights of es-
tablishment or the provision of services for U.S. lawyers in the
Community would be a bilateral treaty between the U.S. and
the Community that would grant such rights on the basis of
reciprocity. This is quite unlikely, however, because it is diffi-
cult to conceive of the U.S. government and the Community
institutions devoting so much time and attention to the con-
cerns of one profession. A bilateral treaty covering all the
principal professions would raise complex questions which
would make it equally unlikely.
'A more suitable vehicle might be multilateral recognition
of the principles of effective market access and national treat-
ment with regard to the legal profession in the context of the
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. In fact, these negotia-
tions do include trade in services. Although the principal fo-
cus has been on financial services, information services, and
telecommunications, legal services is on the list of those for
207. Id. at 1197.
208. Id.
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which liberalization is sought.2 °9 Unfortunately, a U.S. initia-
tive to treat legal services specifically has apparently not suc-
ceeded. Moreover, there are serious differences between the
United States and the Community on the scope of liberaliza-
tion to be achieved in the financial services sector (not to speak
of the current impasse on agriculture), so that the fate of the
Uruguay Round in general, and the nature of liberalization in
trade in services in particular, is still in doubt.
Even if the ultimate GATI Uruguay Round trade in serv-
ices text is stated more in the form of general principles of en-
couraging effective market access and national treatment, as
opposed to specifically enforceable detailed rules, this will still
be helpful. It may provide the basis for bilateral discussions
between the United States and the Community to encourage a
more liberal attitude in both.
In any event, as indicated above, U.S. law firms are en-
countering difficulties in only a few Community states at the
present time. The 1989 German law has for the first time ena-
bled U.S. law firms to open branch offices there and many are
doing S0.2 10 As the German law requires reciprocity in the
United States, the German Ministry of Justice must at some
point decide whether U.S. law firms from states that have not
enacted legal consultant rules are entitled to open offices; if its
decision is adverse, this might encourage more U.S. states to
adopt such rules. In contrast, the 1990 French legislation,
although according "grandfather" rights to the over thirty U.S.
law firms that presently have offices, appears to prevent new
U.S. firms from opening branches.2 1 ' The French Ministry of
Justice is aware of U.S. law firms' concern about this, and a
method of resolving the matter may yet be found.
Apart from rights of practice, there is also the very impor-
tant issue of applicable rules of professional conduct. The
Community at least has the assurance that under ABA Model
209. See Tania Friederichs, Regulations of the Legal Profession as an Issue in Interna-
tional Trade Negotiations: The Community View of the Uruguay Round, in INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PRACTICE TODAY: PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ETHICS AND LIABILITY, supra
note 9. See generally Fred Lazar, Services and the GA T: US Motives and a Blueprint for
Negotiation, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1990, at 135; Phedon Nicolaides, Economic Aspects of
Services: Implications for a GATT Agreement, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1989, at 125.
210. See supra note 10.
211. See supra note 11.
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Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") 8.1, U.S. law-
yers from states that have adopted the Model Rules are ex-
pressly bound by those rules even when established abroad, a
principle which is presumably implicit in the older Model Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code").21 There need
therefore be no concern that U.S. lawyers established in the
Community under their home title would not be subject to any
rules. Moreover, those U.S. lawyers who become lawyers in
Community States, e.g., French or Belgian avocats, are obvi-
ously subject to the host state professional rules.
As the CCBE Code of Conduct is being seriously consid-
ered for adoption by European states outside the Community,
the interesting question arises as to whether it could serve as
the basis for a common understanding between the United
States and the Community. This has definite appeal, in that it
might reduce local opposition to the activities of foreign law-
yers on both sides. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, one of the
leading U.S. authorities on professional responsibility, re-
marked in a short comment on the Code of Conduct that
"[m]any of its rules closely resemble those of the 1983 ABA
Rules of Professional Conduct," which is an encouraging ap-
praisal.213 On the other hand, he notes the presence of some
significant differences, which are based in part on different tra-
ditions.
As John Toulmin has noted,21 4 the ABA and the CCBE
have created ad hoc committees of experts to discuss the
CCBE Code of Conduct approach and any significant differ-
ences with respect to U.S. rules. Thus far, their discussions
have been private, with no published reports. Even if these
experts are unable to recommend any form of adoption of the
Code of Conduct to cover the cross-border practice of U.S.
lawyers in the Community and vice-versa, it is to be hoped that
they may issue a report that might incite further analysis of the
differences in rules and how possible conflicts might be re-
solved.
212. A New York appellate court upheld the disbarment of a New York lawyer,
practicing in London, for misuse of client funds in London, in application of the
Model Code. In re Stults, 433 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), appeal denied, 423
N.E.2d 58 (N.Y. 1981).
213. Geoffrey Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 30, 1992, at 13.
214. Toulmin, supra note 46, at 676.
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A careful reading of the CCBE Code of Conduct reveals
immediately some striking differences with respect to the
Model Rules and the Model Code. Perhaps most provocative
is a point concerning the basic nature of professional rules.
Rule 1.1 of the CCBE Code of Conduct lays equal stress on the
lawyer's obligations to the client, the courts, the legal profes-
sion, and the general public, whereas the U.S. attitude, drawn
from our common law tradition, gives, in Professor Hazard's
words, "strong prominence" to a lawyer's obligations to the
client.2 1 5 This difference may have an impact: Professor Haz-
ard notes that CCBE Code Rule 4.4 forbids a lawyer to "give
false or misleading information to the court," which goes fur-
ther than Model Rule 3.3 which prohibits a lawyer from know-
ingly presenting false evidence. 2 6 Because it is most unlikely
that U.S. lawyers will appear before courts in the Community,
this is probably an issue of only theoretical importance.
In contrast, of great practical importance is the fact that
CCBE Code Rule 3.2 on conflicts of interest does not ex-
pressly permit client waivers of a conflict, which is not only
permitted by Model Rule 1.8 and Model Code Disciplinary
Rule 5-104(A), but is standard practice in the U.S. The ability
to secure client waivers of conflicts is especially important in
international practice, because a large branch office network
creates a significantly higher risk of conflicts among clients.
Another obvious difference is that the CCBE Code of
Conduct generally prohibits contingent fees in Rule 3.3, while
Model Rule 1.5 expressly permits contingent fees, and they are
implicitly permitted by Model Code Ethical Consideration 2-
20. U.S. tort lawyers, who maintain that contingent fees are
essential to enable poor clients to have any realistic opportu-
nity to recover damages in tort, are sure to vigorously protest
any attempt to prevent them from representing U.S. clients in
some capacity on a contingent fee basis, when the clients have
suffered a tort injury in a Community state.
Also, CCBE Code Rule 5.1 makes a lawyer responsible for
payment of correspondent lawyer's fees, and Rule 5.6 forbids a
lawyer from acting for a new client until the client has paid the
fees of a prior lawyer in the same matter. U.S. lawyers are apt
215. Hazard, supra note 213, at 14.
216. Id.
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to find both of these rules inappropriate as obligations,
whatever they may think of them as aspirations.
Also troublesome are CCBE Code Rule 2.5 which forbids
lawyers to have incompatible occupations (e.g., service on a
corporate board of directors) in states where that is forbidden,
and Rule 2.6 on personal publicity, which prohibits or restricts
advertising or other publicity to the extent the host state pro-
hibits or restricts it. Although U.S. lawyers may consider that
both of these rules represent restrictions that do not accord
with modern legal practice, they are not restrictions which are
apt to seriously impede practice by U.S. lawyers in the Com-
munity.
Despite the above-mentioned differences (and others that
may be perceived in careful comparative analysis), the Code of
Conduct, with certain modifications to conform to binding
U.S. rules, may still prove to be the basis of some statement on
commonly-accepted professional responsibility standards be-
tween the ABA and CCBE. In any event, the process of com-
parative analysis can only be helpful.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to achieve several goals. The
most fundamental one was to present the Community law on a
lawyer's right to practice in providing cross-border services
under Article 59 and in a form of establishment protected by
Article 59. In Parts II to V, the Article has accordingly concen-
trated on the Community legislation and Court of Justice case
law which articulates the present scope of such rights. In
presenting a comprehensive and analytical review, especially of
recent developments, it is hoped that the Article will be in-
formative.
Second, the Article in Part I has attempted to place the
need for further action to expand Community lawyers' rights
of practice in a broader context, namely, that of furthering the
integration of the internal market. In that context, the Article
has stressed in Part VII the need to recognize rights of law
firms as well as those of individual lawyers. The Article has
accordingly critically reviewed and generally endorsed the
CCBE draft directive on establishment in Part VI. Finally, the
Article has attempted to analyze the issue of the right of estab-
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lishment under the home state title in a host state, and has
urged that this right should be recognized in Part VII.B.
Third, the Article has tried to emphasize the need for
careful analysis of applicable rules of professional conduct and
ethics. In this context, in Part VI it has praised the helpful har-
monization represented by the CCBE Code of Conduct, while
urging in Part VIII a more intensive examination of the diffi-
cult issues that the 1977 directive on lawyers' services and the
Code of Conduct have left unresolved.
Finally, the Article has attempted to review the status of
U.S. lawyers within the Community legal regime and to em-
phasize the need to foster further U.S.-E.C. cross-border legal
practice. Such cross-border practice benefits clients, facilitates
U.S.-E.C. trade, and helps to bridge the cultural gap between
diverse legal traditions. It is fitting to close with the hope that
the present trend toward liberalization of cross-border legal
practice will acquire increasing momentum with the passage of
time.
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APPENDIX
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
of 22 March 1977
to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to pro-
vide services
(77/249/EEC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, and in particular Articles 57 and 66
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee2 ,
Whereas, pursuant to the Treaty, any restriction on the provi-
sion of services which is based on nationality or on conditions
of residence has been prohibited since the end of the transi-
tional period;
Whereas this Directive deals only with measures to facilitate
the effective pursuit of the activities of lawyers by way of provi-
sion of services; whereas more detailed measures will be neces-
sary to facilitate the effective exercise of the right of establish-
ment;
Whereas if lawyers are to exercise effectively the freedom to
provide services host Member States must recognize as lawyers
those persons practising the profession in the various Member
States;
Whereas, since this Directive solely concerns provision of serv-
ices and does not contain provisions on the mutual recognition
of diplomas, a person to whom the Directive applies must
adopt the professional title used in the Member State in which
he is established, hereinafter referred to as 'the Member State
from which he comes',
1. OJ No C 103, 5. 10. 1972, p. 19 and 0J C No C 53, 8. 3. 1976, p. 33.
2. OJ No C 36, 28. 3. 1970, p. 37 and OJ No C 50, 4. 3. 1976, p. 17.
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HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
1. This Directive shall apply, within the limits and under the
conditions laid down herein, to the activities of lawyers pur-
sued by way of provision of services.
Notwithstanding anything contained-in this Directive, Member
States may reserve to prescribed categories of lawyers the
preparation of formal documents for obtaining title to admin-
ister estates of deceased persons, and the drafting of formal
documents creating or transferring interests in land.
2. 'Lawyer' means any person entitled to pursue his profes-
sional activities under one of the following designations:
Belgium: Avocat-Advocaat
Denmark: Advokat
Germany: Rechtsanwalt
France: Avocat
Ireland: Barrister
Solicitor
Italy: Avvocato
Luxembourg: Avocat-Avoue
Netherlands: Advocaat
United Kingdom: Advocate
Barrister
Solicitor
Article 2
Each Member State shall recognize as a lawyer for the purpose
of pursuing the activities specified in Article 1 (1) any person
listed in paragraph 2 of that Article.
Article 3
A person referred to in Article 1 shall adopt the professional
title used in the Member State from which he comes, expressed
in the language or one of the languages, of that State, with an
indication of the professional organization by which he is au-
thorized to practise or the court of law before which he is enti-
tled to practise pursuant to the laws of that State.
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Article 4
1. Activities relating to the representation of a client in legal
proceedings or before public authorities shall be pursued in
each host Member State under the conditions laid down for
lawyers established in that State, with the exception of any con-
ditions requiring residence, or registration with a professional
organization, in that State.
2. A lawyer pursuing these activities shall observe the rules of
professional conduct of the host Member State, without preju-
dice to his obligations in the Member State from which he
comes.
3. When these activities are pursued in the United Kingdom,
'rules of professional conduct of the host Member State'
means the rules of professional conduct applicable to solici-
tors, where such activities are not reserved for barristers and
advocates. Otherwise the rules of professional conduct appli-.
cable to the latter shall apply. However, barristers from Ire-
land shall always be subject to the rules of professional con-
duct applicable in the United Kingdom to barristers and advo-
cates.
When these activities are pursued in Ireland 'rules of profes-
sional conduct of the host Member State' means, in so far as
they govern the oral presentation of a case in court, the rules
of conduct applicable to barristers. In all other cases the rules
of professional conduct applicable to solicitors shall apply.
However, barristers and advocates from the United Kingdom
shall always be subject to the rules of professional conduct ap-
plicable in Ireland to barristers.
4. A lawyer pursuing activities other than those referred to in
paragraph 1 shall remain subject to the conditions and rules of
professional conduct of the Member State from which he
comes without prejudice to respect for the rules, whatever
their source, which govern the profession in the host Member
State, especially those concerning the incompatibility of the
exercise of the activities of a lawyer with the exercise of other
activities in that State, professional secrecy, relations with
other lawyers, the prohibition on the same lawyer acting for
parties with mutually conflicting interests, and publicity. The
latter rules are applicable only if they are capable of being ob-
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served by a lawyer who is not established in the host Member
State and to the extent to which their observance is objectively
justified to ensure, in that State, the proper exercise of a law-
yer's activities, the standing of the profession and respect for
the rules concerning incompatibility.
Article 5
For the pursuit of activities relating to the representation of a
client in legal proceedings, a Member State may require law-
yers to whom Article 1 applies:
- to be introduced, in accordance with local rules or customs,
to the presiding judge and, where appropriate, to the Presi-
dent of the relevant Bar in the host Member State;
- to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practises before
the judicial authority in question and who would, where neces-
sary, be answerable to that authority, or with an 'avoue' or
'procuratore' practising before it.
Article 6
Any Member State may exclude lawyers who are in the salaried
employment of a public or private undertaking from pursuing
activities relating to the representation of that undertaking in
legal proceedings in so far as lawyers established in that State
are not permitted to pursue those activities.
Article 7
1. The competent authority of the host Member State may
request the person providing the services to establish his quali-
fications as a lawyer.
2. In the event of non-compliance with the obligations re-
ferred to in Article 4 and in force in the host Member State, the
competent authority of the latter shall determine in accordance
with its own rules and procedures the consequences of such
non-compliance, and to this end may obtain any appropriate
professional information concerning the person providing the
services. It shall notify the competent authority of the Member
State from which the person comes of any decision taken.
Such exchanges shall not affect the confidential nature of the
information supplied.
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Article 8
1. Member States shall bring into force the measures neces-
sary to comply with this Directive within two years of its notifi-
cation and shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
texts of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in
the field covered by this Directive.
Article 9
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 22 March 1977.
For the Council
The President
Judith HART
